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THE MILITARY POLITICS OF NORTH SUMATRA 
DECEMBER 1956 - OCTOBER 1957*
John R. W. Smail
This paper is concerned with the daerah crisis in North 
Sumatra between December 1956 and October 1957. The period 
chosen, like all "periods," is arbitrary; I have adopted it 
because the events between Col. Simbolon's coup of December 22, 
1956 and the complex doings which have the name of the October 
19th Affair can be fashioned into a satisfying short story, and 
because these events can be used to illustrate all the important 
political forces at work in the area at the time. It is only 
in this sense that I call these ten or eleven months a period.
It should be made clear, too, what is meant by the state­
ment that this paper is concerned with North Sumatra. Obviously 
the events described were part of the history of the whole of 
Indonesia in the same period. North Sumatra is a part of 
Indonesia; its daerah crisis developed alongside similar crises 
in other daerah of the country; the course of events there 
was strongly affected by outside forces: central government
policy, Banteng Council policy and so forth. These matters being 
related, it is of great importance to establish the angle from 
which they will be viewed. When Chief of Staff Nasution flies 
to Medan on October 20, 1957 to try to settle the October 19th 
Affair, it makes a good deal of difference--more than might seem 
at first glance— whether one positions oneself in Djakarta and 
sees him leaving for one of many troubled daerah or whether one 
positions oneself in Medan and sees him arriving to involve him­
self once more in North Sumatran matters. In this paper I will 
attempt to look at things from this- latter point of view.
The Province of North Sumatra, in December 1956, consisted 
of three residencies, Atjeh, East Sumatra and Tapanuli (see map). 
Atjeh, which will not play a very large part in this story, had 
a population of about one and a half million; it was (and is)
* The original version of this paper was written in the spring of 
1958 while I was studying at Cornell under a grant from the Ford 
Foundation's Foreign Area Fellowship Program. If the present 
version is an improvement it is due principally to the generosity 
of Ruth McVey who has loaned me her research notes on a some­
what greater volume of material than I had used and sent me 
letters of commentary and analysis whose total length is greater 
than that of my original manuscript. She will recognize much in 
this article which is hers.
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relatively homogeneous ethnically and religiously. Tapanuli, 
with about one and three quarter million people, was less 
homogeneous. Mainland Tapanuli is the home of the Batak, 
particularly of the Toba Batak, the largest and most important 
element of the Batak group. The North Tapanuli Toba, who were 
rather unsophisticated hill-dwellers when the first Protestant 
missionaries reached them in the middle of the 19th century, 
reacted with unusual vigor to the stimulus of this Western intru­
sion; in less than a century they had expanded, both geographical­
ly into the Residency of East Sumatra, and culturally and socially 
into a strong position in such fields as education, the civil 
service and the army, both in North Sumatra and in Indonesia as 
a whole.1 This expansion, and the reactions to it among other 
groups, is the single most important factor in the social back­
ground of the events which we will be following in this paper.
South Tapanuli, the area of the Mandailing and Angkola Batak 
(collectively, the Southern Batak) is distinguishable from the 
Toba areas in several respects, particularly in its conversion to 
Islam in the decades before the middle of the 19th century, 
rather than to Christianity as in North Tapanuli. Finally, the 
Nias Islands are included in Tapanuli, though they have little 
political significance.
The former residency of East Sumatra, the seat of most 
of the events covered in this paper, is a region of unusual com­
plexity. Its population of some two and a half million in 1956 
consisted of three major groups of roughly equal size: Javanese, 
Toba Batak, and the original inhabitants (Karo Batak, mainly in 
the north; Simelungun Batak to the south of them; and Malays 
along the coast); along with these were substantial minorities 
of Chinese and Atjehnese. This confusion of populations, like 
so much else that is complex in East Sumatra, had its roots in 
the modern economic history of the area. Tobacco, rubber, oil 
palm and other plantations were what made East Sumatra what it 
was. They accounted directly for the large Javanese and smaller 
Chinese populations, which were brought in to work the plantations, 
and indirectly for a considerable part of the Toba immigration.
They made East Sumatra the most important single area of export 
production in the country (in 1956 it was producing a good half 
of Indonesia's foreign exchange earnings). They made Medan a 
great city— in 1956, with over 400,000 inhabitants, the fifth or 
sixth largest in the country— and the economic, educational, and 
political metropolis of the whole province. Finally, the slow and 
painful decay of this plantation system, deprived of its political 
support by the decline and then elimination of Dutch rule, pro­
duced two of the most important and intractable socio-economic 
problems troubling the residency in 1956. One was a massive 
movement of Toba, Javanese and indigenous squatters, which had
1. For an excellent field study of this movement see Clark 
Cunningham, The Postwar Migration and Settlement of the 
Toba Bataks (New York: IPR7 1958).
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reached an estimated half million by 1956, onto estate lands.
The other was a fierce conflict between estate managements and 
plantation workers’ unions, principally the Communist-led 
Sarbupri (Sarekat Buruh Perkebunan Republik Indonesia).2
Socially, too, East Sumatra was tense and divided. I have 
already mentioned the flow of Toba into East Sumatra’s education 
and ciyj.1 services. In 1956 a disproportionate share of the 
teachers, students and civil servants in the residency were Toba, 
mostly Christians as well, and their preponderance was inevitably 
resented by others. On a different plane was the problem of the 
pre-conquest petty rulers of the area— coastal Malay, Karo and 
Simelungun— who were preserved by the Dutch under indirect rule 
and fitted into the plantation system, and thus acquired much 
greater, extra-traditional power and privileges. This class was 
severely mauled in the "Social Revolution" of East Sumatra which 
reached a peak in March 1946, reasserted itself between 1947 and 
1950 in the Negara Sumatra Timur (the [member] State of East 
Sumatra, in the Dutch-organized federal system for Indonesia) 
and was finally dug out of the political structure in 1950. But 
its social influence, and feelings against it, were still impor­
tant in 1956.
The demographic, economic and social issues inevitably had 
political consequences. To take an outstanding example, the 
Toba influx and Toba predominance in prestigious positions made 
many of the indigenous East Sumatrans yearn for a turning back 
of the clock. This growing desire took political form in Septem­
ber 1956 with the formation of the Kongres Rakjat Sumatra Timur 
(KRST— East Sumatra People’s Congress) which aimed at an "auton­
omous" East Sumatra, that is, political and administrative sepa­
ration of the Residencies of Tapanuli and East Sumatra. As this 
campaign developed in the course of 1957 it naturally aroused a 
Toba response, but it also drew in political energies generated 
in other spheres of socio-economic tension. Thus opponents of 
the KRST accused it of fronting for the old indirect rulers of 
the colonial era, and the PKI, whose strength lay among organized 
plantation workers and squatters, became deeply involved in the 
anti-"autonomy" movement.
East Sumatra in 1956 was politically divided in organiza­
tional terns as well as on issues. Four major parties stood 
out above a crowd of smaller ones: three of the national big
four (PNI, PKI and Masjumi) and Parkindo (Partai Keristen 
Indonesia— Indonesian Christian [Protestant] Party) representing 
chiefly the Toba. It is noticeable, however, that party politics 
as such did not play much of a role in the events we shall be 
looking at. Everywhere in Indonesia in 1957 formal political
2. Karl Pelzer, "The Agrarian Conflict in East Sumatra," Pacific 
Affairs (30) June 1957, pp. 151-159.
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machinery was increasingly neglected in favor of either mass 
action or military maneuver, and in this respect, at least, North 
Sumatra was entirely typical.
Laid over this society like a thin wet sheet over a body, 
picking up a perfect imprint of the complexities of its shape, 
was the Bukit Barisan Division, incorporated in the Tentara dan 
Territorium I (TT-I, First Military Region). In all respects —  
its territorial arrangement, the ethnic background of its 
troops and officers, and their political leanings— it was not 
so much a division of the Indonesian Army as the military ele­
ment in and of North Sumatra. The great majority of its men 
and officers had first taken up arms in North Sumatra in the 
Revolutionary days; they had fought in North Sumatra as the 
military arm of the Revolution; and with the transfer of 
sovereignty they stayed on in North Sumatra, constituting a 
military organization outside the civil structure and yet par­
allel to it. In 1956 and after, when the civil structure showed 
signs of being unable to stand the strains being placed on it, 
the division was still there. As a North Sumatran organization» 
it was able to absorb civil authority in North Sumatra more 
naturally and with less of a shock than if it had been a pro­
fessional army of the Western type. As a North Sumatran organi­
zation, too, it was able to carry on the politics of North 
Sumatra, which fell into its hands along with civil authority.
It is from this viewpoint that the events which we are going to 
follow are best seen.
As of December 1956, TT-I was organized as follows. It 
had a headquarters in Medan, also the seat of the Governor of 
North Sumatra. Attached to this there were artillery, armored, 
military police and other special units. On the next level, it 
had four regiments. The First Regiment was coterminous with the 
residency of Atjeh, the Second with the residency of East Sumatra, 
and the Third with the residency of Tapanuli. The Fourth Regiment, 
because of the odd fact that Sumatra had three provinces but only 
two military regions, covered an area entirely outside the 
Province of North Sumatra— the northern part of Central Sumatra. 
There are no figures available on the strengths of these units, 
but it is doubtful whether the whole Bukit Barisan Division had 
much more than about 10,000 men, of whom the greater number were 
in the areas of the Second Regiment, because of the importance of 
East Sumatra, and the First Regiment, because of the three years’ 
old Daud Beureueh rebellion in Atjeh. Finally the KMKB Medan 
(Komando Militer Kota Besar Medan--City Military Command), because 
of the size of the units belonging to it and the political 
significance of the city itself, had the same kind of role and 
weight as the four regiments.
At this time the Panglima (a word somewhat weakly translated 
as Commanding Officer) of TT-I was Colonel Maludin Simbolon, a
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Christian Toba Batak who had held the post since 1950 and was one 
of the most prestigious officers in the Indonesian Army. On the 
national political scene he had several times— most notably in 
the October 17th, 1952 and the June 27th, 1955 Affairs— played a 
major role in the opposition to Sukarno. During 1955 he had 
been one of the three or four leading candidates for Chief of 
Staff of the Army, the office to which Nasution was eventually 
reappointed at the end of that year. Since the middle of 1956, 
in part because of these past events, Simbolon had been slated 
for replacement. Up to the middle of November his substitute 
was to have been Colonel Zulkifli Lubis, a Mandailing Batak, a 
political ally of his in the June 27th Affair and later, and at 
that time Vice Chief of Staff of the Army- But with Lubis' 
attempted coup in Djakarta on November 16th and subsequent re­
treat into hiding,this arrangement had to be changed. On 
November 25th Nasution called Simbolon to Djakarta and persuaded 
him to agree to being replaced by Lt. Djamin Gintings, a Karo 
Batak and former commander of the Second Regiment, who had been 
appointed Chief of Staff of TT-I in March 1956. Simbolon showed 
his extreme reluctance by asking for delays and his resentment 
by criticizing Nasution publicly on other issues. During the 
month which followed, Nasution kept up the pressure; eventually 
it was understood that the transfer would take place on December 
28th. This deadline was one of the chief factors in urging 
Simbolon into his coup on December 22nd.h 34
3. This paper can only touch briefly on events and situations 
in Djakarta and other daerah, which nevertheless have con­
siderable relevance to what was going on in North Sumatra.
For further information in such cases see Herbert Feith, The 
Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1962).
4. This greatly simplifies the complex politics of replacing
Simbolon. For more on Zulkifli Lubis, including his actual 
arrival in Medan on September 14th for a formal transfer of 
command ceremony which did not come off, see Waspada, July 3, 
August 20, September 12, 14, 15, 29, 1956. For rumors that 
Simbolon's replacement would be Dahlan Djambek, see Sin Po, 
November 26, 1956. In late November and early December it 
seems to have been understood that Gintings was to be only a 
stopgap, pending the discovery of a regular panglima for TT-I. 
For an explicit statement of this by an Army Headquarters 
spokesman see Harian Rakjat, November 27, 1956. This provides 
a useful clue for understanding Gintings' behavior and posi­
tion during Simbolon's coup and in 1957. For a general pic­
ture of these transactions see Prime Minister Ali Sastroami- 
djojo's report to Parliament on January 21 1957: Kementerian
Penerangan, Keterangan Pemerintah tentang kedjadian2 di Sumatera 
dalam bulan Desember 1956 (Djakarta, 1957>, with twenty-one of
of the documents in the whole case appended. [Hereafter this? 
source will be referred to as Kempen, Kediadian2 di Sumatera.]
A generally reliable English translation appears in PIA,
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The commanders of the major units under Simbolon's command 
must also be mentioned, for they will all play a part in the 
events to come. In December 1956 the commander of the First 
Regiment (Atjeh) was Lt. Col. Sjamaun Gaharu, himself an 
Atjehnese who had played a leading role in military affairs in 
Atjeh during the first half year of the Revolution before suf­
fering a coup. Gaharu had only just returned to Atjeh as regi­
mental commander the previous May, after a decade away from home. 
The commander of the Second Regiment (East Sumatra) was Lt. Col. 
Abdul Wahab Makmour, a Moslem but otherwise of obscure back­
ground— he was apparently part Karo, part Atjehnese and had been 
born on the west coast of North Sumatra where Tapanuli marches 
on Atjeh. Makmour was sometimes said during the events of 1957 
to be a PKI member or at least a Communist sympathizer, but his 
actions can be satisfactorily accounted for on other assumptions 
as well. This creates difficulties which I will discuss later 
on. The commander of the Third Regiment (Tapanuli) was Major 
Junus Samosir, a Christian' Toba, recently appointed, like Gaharu 
and Makmour, as well as Sugiharto (below). The commander of the 
Fourth Regiment (Central Sumatra) was Lt. Col. Ahmad Husein, a 
Minangkabau. Finally the commander of the KMKB Medan, the fifth 
of the major units under TT-I, was Lt. Col. Sugiharto, a Javanese 
who had been raised in Bandung and had spent most of his military 
career in West Java.
To give these seven names and to indicate their background 
is to give only a sketch of the distribution of power in TT-I 
on the eve of Simbolon's coup. For one thing, as the events of 
1957 were to show, the men holding these seven highest offices 
were by no means the only ones with a say in what happened in TT-1. 
Newpaper reports alone mention several dozen officers of lower 
rank playing obviously important roles in the events we are con­
cerned with,and a full analysis would require further information 
about these, and many others, which would be very difficult to 
acquire.
For another, the distribution of positions— in the middle and 
lower ranks as well as the top ones given above— was far from 
stable or permanent. Things had been much more stable between 
1950 and 1955, but during 1956 new forces were at work: at the
national level, a country-wide reshuffling of army posts being 
carried on by the new Chief of Staff Nasution, at the local level 
an effervescence of ethnic and factional sentiment to be dis­
cussed in a moment. We have already seen that five of the top 
seven posts in TT-I had been transferred to new hands during 
1956; the same is true of nine of the eleven next highest posts
January 22, 1957, morning edition. [Hereafter, PIA*s morn­
ing edition will be cited as M, the arxernoon edition as A.]
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in the division,5 and similar high percentages may well have 
prevailed in lower-ranking positions about which there is less 
information.
Finally, in surveying the distribution of military strength 
in North Sumatra, one must keep in mind that the origins of the 
Indonesian army were historical, not bureaucratic, and that the 
Bukit Barisan Division was simply a partly-institutionalized 
section of the Revolutionary movement. Outside the army, in the 
gap between the military and civilian roles which we more sharply 
distinguish, were tens of thousands of pedjuang (freedom fight­
ers) who claimed a special role in the affairs of the Republic 
they had fought for and who, when conditions were right, could 
be mobilized by their former leaders both inside and outside the 
army. In 1956, after five fairly tidy years, conditions were 
becoming more nearly right.
Those five years had ended symbolically with the elections 
of late 1955, the anticipation of which had muffled discontent 
and whose arrival had released it again, more powerful for the 
delay. The events dealt with in this paper took place in a con­
text determined by the surprisingly rapid decay and then collapse 
of the regime under which Indonesia had been governed since 1950. 
We are accustomed to following this process during 1956 from a 
Djakarta point of view. In this perspective the main features 
are a steady decline in the civilian government's authority and, 
as a natural response to this deepening vacuum of power, the 
rise of two countervailing forces: a daerah movement directed
against the center, and an army movement directed at replacing 
civilians in authority in both the center and the regions.6 
Events in North Sumatra in 1956 and 1957 fit easily into this 
framework. North Sumatra took its place among other daerah whose 
more or less independent action, under military leadership, both 
resulted from and helped cause the decline of parliamentary rule 
in the country.
5. The eleven posts I have in mind here were the Vice Chief of 
Staff, the Assistants in charge of staff sections I through 
V, and the Chiefs of Staff of the four regiments plus KMKB 
Medan. For some of the reports of transfers inside TT-I 
during 1956 see Waspada (1956) March 24, 28, 31; April 5; 
July 3, 7, 17 (long list); August 3, 4, 11, 24; September 19. 
See also Sin Po, November 26, 1956.
6. This is again a drastically simplified picture of a complex 
nation-wide development. Most writers, for example, would 
include Sukarno's forward movement along with those of the 
daerah and the army when describing this process. I exclude 
it because it was not nearly so relevant to the concerns
of this paper as the other two.
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The view from Medan is necessarily different. In re­
lation to Djakarta Medan was daerah, but inside North Sumatra 
it was the capital, and it was afflicted with the same prob­
lems as Djakarta: daerahism at residency or lower levels,
rising suku (ethnic) tensions, officers discontented with the 
status quo. The same event, therefore, is likely to look very 
different according to whether it is being viewed from Djakarta 
or Medan.
To illustrate this point, and at the same time to des­
cribe the first major break with the status quo in North 
Sumatra, it is worth going into some detail on the Teluk Ni- 
bung smuggling affair between about January and July 1956.
In the beginning, one source claims, this was a private 
arrangement between a Medan businessman, Chin Hock, and 
Simbolon. Chin Hock did the smuggling— substantial quantities 
of rubber to Malaya— while Simbolon protected him and shared 
in the proceeds. The story became known to officers in the 
division, however, and to protect himself Simbolon called in 
all regimental and battalion commanders and offered to include 
them in the project, saying that he had been doing this to 
collect money to build barracks and otherwise improve condi­
tions for the soldiers in TT-I. (These motives were also 
advanced as justification for the second phase of the smuggling.) 
The commanders agreed,but only after setting various conditions, 
including ones concerning personnel, to which Simbolon consented.7
7. The only source I know of for this story is the statement 
by the press officer of TT-I, Capt. Matang Sitepu, on Feb­
ruary 19, 1957 (PIA February 20 (A), 1957; Harian Rakjat, 
February 21, 1957). Sitepu was an interested party, 
speaking for anti-Simbolon forces in the division after 
the failure of Simbolon's coup. But the story gains credence 
from two further events. The first is that one of the many 
personnel transfers in mid-1956 was the appointment of Major 
Lahiradja Munthe to head of Section IV of TT-I headquarters. 
Munthe (then acting commander of the First Regiment) was 
specifically singled out by Sitepu among the commanders who 
insisted on conditions from Simbolon in the bargaining men­
tioned above, and Section IV of the staff and Munthe himself 
were mentioned specifically in the reportage for the last 
months of 1956 as supervising the distribution of the Teluk 
Nibung proceeds. The second is an incident which began on 
February 13th 1956, when Major Boyke Nainggolan (then com­
manding the 131st Battalion in Medan) took action on his 
own to arrest a number of officers, including Lt. Col.
Ibrahim Adjie (then division Chief of Staff) and Major Junus 
Samosir (then commander of KMKB Medan) on charges of corrup­
tion. The incident was settled with Djakarta army head­
quarters playing a part in the negotiations. Among the 
changes which appear to have been part of the solution were
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The second phase of the smuggling was much larger and soon 
became known to the public. Between May 15th and June 5th TT-I 
under Simbolon arranged for the illegal shipping to Malaya of 
very large quantities of rubber from the small East Sumatran 
port of Teluk Nibung. Smuggling it was, technically, but of a 
peculiar sort, since Simbolon notified various high officials 
in Djakarta in advance. This added to the political impact of 
the event when the smuggling became known in the course of June, 
because it showed not only that TT-I was disposed to massive 
violation of the law but also that the government, or at least 
those of its high officials who had been told, seemed incapable 
of stopping it. Later, once the affair was out in the open, the 
government did stop TT-I from any further Teluk Nibungs, but 
equally it punished no one and left the proceeds in TT-Ifs hands.8
These were the circumstances. From the Djakarta point of 
view it was the second phase which was the significant one and 
this was a straightforward and typical story of military-led 
daerah defiance and governmental weakness, closely comparable 
to the Sulawesi copra-smuggling incident at about the same time. 
From the Medan point of view both phases were important, but they 
cast light in different directions. The second phase had the 
same significance as it had for Djakarta, but upside down. The 
first phase, however, gives a graphic picture of changing re­
lationships within the officer group of TT-I. In particular it 
suggests that Simbolonfs five-year rule of TT-I was breaking up.
If NainggolanTs attempted arrests were directed against the 
smuggling, this was most unsettling for Simbolon; at any rate the 
role of Army Headquarters in the aftermath of the affair (helping 
or interfering) was a bad sign for him, as were the subsequent 
transfers.9 Certainly the confrontation with his subordinate
the sending of Nainggolan abroad for study (March), Gintings1 
replacing Adjie as Chief of Staff (March) and Samosir's shift 
to the command of the Third Regiment (August). (Waspada, 
February 13, 15, 19, 20, 22, 1956.) These reports do not say 
what corruption Nainggolan had in mind, but the seriousness 
of the incident and particularly its timing make it seem 
likely that it was the first phase of the smuggling.
8. On the second phase see Boyd Compton, "Army Smuggling, North 
Sumatra," Newsletter of the Institute of Current World Affairs, 
July 13, 1956; Feith, op. cit., pp. 498-500; and the original 
version of this paper, p. 4. These and other accounts make
no mention of what is called here the first phase, the present 
description of which is based on research by Ruth McVey.
9. His ally Samosir was replaced in the strategic command of 
KMKB Medan by Sugiharto, one of the leaders of the subsequent 
counter-coup against him; Gintings was promoted to Chief of 
Staff and thereby became a leading candidate to replace him.
The connection, if any, between the smuggling and the other 
transfers in 1956 is not clear; at any rate these transfers,
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officers demanding to be included in the operation, their hard 
bargaining there, and Munthe's subsequent appearance in a post 
which enabled him to keep an eye on the Teluk Nibung proceeds* 
do not suggest a secure panglima. Finally, in the light of the 
above, the whole large second phase of the smuggling has the look 
of an effort by Simbolon to carry his restive officers with him 
by uniting them in defiance of Djakarta and distributing very 
large sums (the bulk of the proceeds) directly to or through 
them.10
From Teluk Nibung we can proceed to the immediate back­
ground of.Simbolon's coup on December 22nd. The first open 
sign of regionalist activity in Sumatra came with a well-pub­
licized reunion of the old revolutionary Banteng Division of 
Central Sumatra, dissolved in 1950 but still a potent unifying 
force for both military and political leaders in the area. This 
meeting, held under the leadership of Lt. Col. Husein of the 
Fourth Regiment between November 20th and 24th, made it quite 
clear that Central Sumatrans were prepared to take strong action 
unless Djakarta proved more cooperative, and it set the pattern 
for similar reunions throughout the Outer Islands in the ensuing 
months.
The Banteng Division reunion, representing a socially quite 
homogeneous area, is easily described: a compact group presenting
a quite clear-cut demand and implicit threat to the central govern­
ment. Its counterpart in TT-I as a whole understandably is not. 
There, on December 4th, a meeting was held of many of the officers 
under Simbolon's command, including several from Husein's regiment, 
to discuss what should be done about the current situation. Out 
of this meeting emerged something later called the "December 4th 
Idea," conveying a sense of urgency and expressing a desire felt 
throughout Indonesia at that time for some sort of radical re­
forming action.11
too,were on balance unfavorable to Simbolon's interests (e.g., 
Makmour, another subsequent leader of the counter-coup, be­
came commander of the Second Regiment; Gaharu was the first 
Atjehnese to be appointed commander of the First Regiment and 
was thereby enabled to link daerahism and military strength 
for the first time).
10. For purported figures on the size of these distributions, 
ranging between five and nine million rupiah per regiment 
(and KMKB Medan), see Matang Sitepu's statement cited in 
note 7 above. The Medan-centered perspective and the pic­
ture of Simbolon's declining authority rendered above were 
suggested to me by Ruth McVey.
11. It was this widespread disillusionment and dissatisfaction 
with the current state of affairs which formed the psycho­
logical background for such dissimilar and opposed movements 
as Sukarno's Guided Democracy and the regionalist coups.
With the weight of established institutions thus pressing
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There is conflicting evidence as to who took the initiative 
in proposing the meeting and the December 4th Idea. On the one 
hand Ali Sastroamidjojo, in his parliamentary statement of 
January 21st, gives the impression that it was largely of 
Simbolon’s doing.12 Certainly Simbolon had reason to try to 
create a platform from which he could launch his coup. He had 
returned from his last interview with Nasution on November 27th 
knowing that within a month or so, if he succeeded in doing 
nothing, he would have to give up his position to Gintings. He 
also had before him the successful example of Husein in leading 
the Banteng Division meeting into an advanced regionalist posi­
tion. On the other hand, it is clear that at least the original 
text of the Idea was drawn up by a group of graduates of the 
SSKAD (Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat--Army Staff and 
Command School) called the "Team SSKAD, TT-I."13 14 The Team’s 
function is not altogether clear— it may have been a standing 
committee of all SSKAD graduates in TT-I, or it may have been an 
ad hoc group of them which is known to have returned from a gen­
eral SSKAD meeting in Java a few days earlier--and neither is its 
full membership. But reported members of it were mostly actively 
anti-Simbolon and so were three of the five members of a committee 
of SSKAD graduates, headed by Lt. Col. Makmour, which was estab­
lished on December 4th to review and refine the Idea.llf
We need not go much further into the complicated history of 
the Idea. It is evident that the notion of radical action was in
more lightly on political life, men were freer to devise new 
forms and naturally reached toward ones which were in accord­
ance with their needs and ambitions.
12. Kempen, Kedjadian2 ^ di Sumatera, in PIA, January 22(M), 1957.
On November 27th Simbolon instructed the officers of TT-I to 
work out a constitutional concept which would be suitable for 
the Republic. (See his press interview with Majors Munthe and 
Zein Hamid as contained e.g. in Harian Rakjat, January 15, 
1957.)
13. Agreed to by both opponents and supporters of Simbolon. Com­
pare the statements of Makmour (Waspada, January 22, 1957) 
and Gaharu (PIA, January 16 (A), 1957). SSKAD (located in 
Bandung) had felt for some time that it had a special 
competence in the field of Army ideology. It was also very 
active in the national-level military politics of this period.
14. The committee may also have composed the draft discussed on 
December 4th. Its members were Makmour, Major*Munthe, Major 
Nelang Sembiring, Major J. Rambe and Capt. M. Sjafei, the 
first three opponents, the last two supporters of Simbolon
at this time (Waspada, January 25, 1957). Makmour emerged as 
an outspoken opponent of Simbolon in this period. Waspada 
(January 2, 1957) reports him as heading a list of more than 
sixty signers of a protest on November 17th against Simbolonfs
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the air; officers of all persuasions could agree on the need for 
it and would not want to be left out while it was being discussed. 
Certainly all parties were involved in the busy round of meetings 
and negotiations which followed in the next twelve days and 
maneuvered through the proceedings for a way to impose a wording 
or interpretation of the Idea which would be useful for their 
side.15
On December 16th twenty-seven leading officers of the TT-I 
met again and adopted a formal statement of the December 4th 
Idea, embodied in what was called the Ikrar Bersama (Collective 
Vow).16 The Ikrar Bersama is an interesting study in political 
semantics; it is an elegant fretwork of national symbols (the 
Independence Proclamation of 1945, the Pantjasila, Bhinneka 
Tunggal Ika) and lofty wording, capped by an operative sentence 
("We have agreed to take firm and revolutionary measures to 
realize the ideals [of the Independence Proclamation] in the 
shortest possible time.")--which was open to almost any inter­
pretation. In TT-I nothing so clear and incisive as the Banteng 
Division statement of November 24th was possible; instead we get 
a formula representing the lowest common denominator of agree­
ment among the factions, a formula so vague that it was used in 
the following months by all factions to support their causes.
After swearing this Ikrar Bersama, the officers then drank 
a toast and smashed their glasses to symbolize their break with 
the old ways. Four days later, on December 20th, Lt. Col.
Husein began the break, by announcing that the Banteng Council 
had taken over in Central Sumatra. With this, Central Sumatra 
passes out of the main line of events in TT-I and becomes, from
November 14th protest against Nasution’s handling of 
Zulkifli Lubis. Apart from sources cited in other notes, 
see also PIA, January 14(A) and 16(M), 1957, for further 
details.
15. By the end the issue seems to have boiled down to the very 
practical question of whether Simbolon should have a free 
hand in interpreting the Idea in action he might take on its 
basis, or whether he should be subject to restrictions, as
his opponents wanted. Simbolon seems to have won full freedom, 
but also thereby full responsibility. The dispute broke out 
again in mid-January when his opponents charged that his 
coup was an improper application of the Idea. See the re­
marks by opponents Prime Minister Ali (PIA, January 22(M),
1957) Munthe and Zein Hamid (PIA, January 14(A), 1957) and 
by supporters Samosir (PIA, January 16(M), 1957) and 
Gaharu (PIA, January 16(A), 1957).
16. For the text of the Ikrar Bersama see Waspada, January 24,
1957 and PIA, January 24(M), 1957 (the latter with a partial 
list of signers). According to Waspada, January 25, 1957,
27 officers signed on December 16th,and the final total of 
48 was achieved over the next week as Simbolon called in 
officers one by one to do so.
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the Medan point of view, as much of an outside force as Djakarta. 
It was only an accident of military organization that had brought 
the distant Fourth Regiment area into TT-I in the first place, 
and these events made quick work of the connection.
Simbolon followed Husein by only a little more than a day. 
Early in the morning of December 22nd,he announced over the Medan 
radio that he was cutting off relations with the Central Govern­
ment temporarily and assuming authority over the area of TT-I.17 
He criticized the behavior of the politicians of the center and 
said that he no longer recognized the authority of the present 
Cabinet; he added, however, that if a good cabinet were formed, he 
would return authority to it. He was careful to emphasize that 
he was still faithful to the Independence Proclamation of 1945 
and was not setting up a separate state.18
On the same day Simbolon declared a state of war and siege 
(SOB) over his territory and announced the construction of an 
elaborate piece of government machinery consisting of a "Revolu­
tionary Command," headed by himself, and a "Gadjah Command," 
headed by Gintings, who was to double as Military Governor. These 
organs were flanked by four different advisory councils and a 
"Revolutionary Cabinet."19
How are we to see this drastic move by Simbolon? It is 
surprising how different it looks from Djakarta and Medan. In 
a Djakarta-centered history it is a daerah coup, alongside so 
many others already accomplished or about to come, only more 
serious in its implications for the status quo because of the 
great importance of the East Sumatran export industries. In the 
perspective of North Sumatran history, despite the obvious pos­
sibilities of greater autonomy, it is just the reverse. Simbolon's 
coup, in local terms, was essentially a desperate effort to shore 
up the now tottering status quo of the 1950-55 period: for 
Simbolon himself, of course, to hold on to his command; for the 
Toba to forestall the replacement of a Toba with a Karo panglima, 
who could reasonably be expected to use the great powers of that
17. Including the Fourth Regiment area. Simbolon's martial law 
decree also covered Husein’s territory. But there is no 
evidence that this was more than a matter of form. The 
Banteng Council was a Central Sumatra organization and had 
no reason to take orders from Medan. The dissolving logic 
of daerahism made it inevitable that Simbolon and Husein 
should part company as panglima and subordinate officer, 
though they continued as political allies.
18. Kempen, Kedjadian2 di Sumatera, pp. 59-61, gives the text of 
this announcement.
19. Waspada, December 26, 1956 gives the anatomy of this new 
government and the names of most of its office-holders.
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office to try to reduce Toba predominance in East Sumatra; for 
most of those, civilian and military, whose jobs or interests 
were province-wide, to prevent the breaking up of the province 
under the pressures of daerahism in its three residencies.
Faced with this challenge from Simbolon, the Cabinet acted 
with unexampled speed. Later in the same day, it announced that 
Simbolon was suspended from office and that Gintings was to take 
his place. It added that if Gintings was unable to assume power, 
Makmour should do so. In order to separate Simbolon as much as 
possible from the Banteng Council and the Atjehnese, it also 
announced that the First and Fourth Regiments were temporarily 
placed under the direct authority of the Army Chief of Staff.
This policy was based on a shrewd understanding of the situation 
in Medan. Knowing that Gintings, as a Karo, could serve as a 
focus for groups inside and outside the army in North Sumatra 
who resented Toba influence, it sought to support any move they 
might be inclined to make against Simbolon by passing the symbols 
of legitimacy immediately to Gintings. The Cabinet’s second 
string, appointing Makmour if Gintings should be unable to act, 
was even shrewder. There is no reason to believe that it wanted 
to see Makmour crowned panglima in Medan; its intention in men­
tioning him was presumably to use him as a stick to beat Gintings 
into action. This is just what happened. Gintings, as it turned 
out, did need prodding; Makmour, an active and unusually out­
spoken opponent of Simbolon, was an excellent candidate to do 
it. Gintings and Makmour came into fierce conflict later, as 
we shall see, over Makmour’s organizing and arming of a Com­
munist-influenced village guard in East Sumatra, and over the 
East Sumatra autonomy movement. If we may read this future con­
flict back into their positions and views of each other on 
December 2 2nd, it is not hard to see that the prospect of 
Makmour as panglima would have given Gintings and the groups 
behind him a powerful stimulus to action.20
Calculations of this sort account for the Cabinet’s swift—  
swift doubtless because it must have known for some time that 
something like this was possible--and strong action against 
Simbolon. This action contrasts sharply with its treatment of 
the Banteng Council, announced the day before, which consisted 
of little more than sending an investigating committee to Padang—  
a committee, moreover, headed by Col. Dahlan Djambek, a 
Minangkabau and an officer so sympathetic to the Banteng Council 
that before eight months were up he had gone to join it. Though 
Simbolon’s posture C”Revolutionary Command”) was less diplomatic 
than Husein’s, their acts amounted essentially to the same thing.
20. See Feith, Decline, pp. 5 2 8-5 29, and the original version of
this paper, p. 9, for more confident analyses of the Gintings- 
Makmour situation at this time, both placing more emphasis on 
Makmour’s PKI affinities. The problem is that there is very 
little information on the Makmour of before December 22nd 
and no certainty about Makmour’s reasons for the political 
line he followed in 1957.
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What was different in the two cases was simply that Husein’s 
troops and his area offered no openings for Djakarta-encouraged 
subversion, while Simbolon was sitting on ten pins, any one of 
which might be knocked out from under him.
The force of this reasoning was apparent to Simbolon. It 
was obviously necessary to give a high post, such as the one he 
gave, to Gintings. He did this before the Cabinet announcement; 
it was necessary for purely local reasons, regardless of what 
the Cabinet did. Moreover, his two radio statements directed to 
Sukarno, on December 24th and 25th, though they involved no real 
change in his position, did make a special point of his loyalty 
to the Republic and to Sukarno himself (a point not appearing in 
his original announcement) and were more lavish in their refer­
ence to the Independence Proclamation, etc. They give the im­
pression that he was going out of his way to emphasize his 
loyalty in order to prevent his opponents from using the charge 
of separatism against him.21
But all this— his appeal to anti-Djakarta sentiment, his 
attempt to placate and neutralize Gintings with high office, the 
new barracks built with the millions of rupiahs from Teluk Nibung, 
his long service as bapak of the Bukit Barisan Division, the 
inertia factor in obeying a command from a military superior, 
the smashed glasses— was of no use against the divisive forces 
of North Sumatran society once they were given an open political 
situation to work in. The ponderous frame of the Gadjah Command 
was pulled down in five days.
There is not very much information as to where Djamin 
Gintings stood in those five days but all that there is shows 
him definitely going along with Simbolon. Makmour is reported 
to have visited him in Medan on December 23rd to ask him to fol­
low the Cabinet’s order to take over command of TT-I, but he re­
fused to do so.22 According to one hostile and highly circum­
stantial report, Gintings played an openly pro-Simbolon role on 
the morning of the 25th, heading a Gadjah Command delegation to 
a parley with the militant Second Regiment officer groups (see 
below) and again refusing to obey the Cabinet’s order. The 
same source mentions a Gadjah Command order signed by Gintings 
on the evening of the 26th instructing the leaders of the Second 
Regiment officer group to report to Medan the next morning (pre­
sumably for disciplining)--this at a time when these officers 
were already on the move in the counter-coup which was to install 
Gintings as panglima within a few hours.23 This last item fits
21. Kempen, Kedjadian2 di Sumatera, pp. 6 2-6 5, gives the texts of 
these two radio addresses.
22. Waspada, February 8, 1957. This is also mentioned briefly 
by Prime Minister Ali (PIA, January 22(M), 1957).
23. Waspada, February 8, 1957.
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with what is the most striking feature of Gintingsf behavior 
in these days; there is no evidence, even from his partisans, 
to suggest that he played any part in the counter-coup which 
brought him to power. All this is not to throw doubt on the 
idea that Gintings and Simbolon at bottom stood for two quite 
opposed groups. It does suggest, however, the many factors-- 
personal loyalty, prudence in an awkward position, lack of 
aggressiveness, a policy of cooperating with Simbolon until 
greater independence from Djakarta had been achieved, genuine 
reluctance to unleash civil strife within East Sumatra, a greater 
fear of Makmour than of Simbolon--which might have led him to 
play a retiring role.
But if Gintings did not act others were ready to do so in 
his stead. The first move came from the kabupaten town of 
Pematang Siantar in the plantation area of Simelungun, which was 
the headquarters of the Second Regiment. Here, on the evening 
of December 24th, a group of 27 captains and lieutenants met 
under the leadership of Captain Langlang Buwana and signed a 
ftJoint Resolution" condemning Simbolonfs coup. Ominously 
taking note of the fact that the Government’s order had not yet 
been carried out, but instead a Gadjah Command had been set up, 
they called once more on Gintings to act. If he was "not pre­
pared or unable" to do so, they called on Makmour; if Makmour 
in turn did not want to, "we are united in our determination to 
carry it out."2 k
The group— on which more later--wasted no time in making 
known its hostility to the coup. According to one story, two 
majors, non-signers, were pressed into service to carry the 
resolution to TT-I headquarters. They arrived in Medan in the 
middle of the night, found a Gadjah Command meeting in session 
and handed over the resolution at 3:30 a.m. The Gadjah Command 
must have taken this new development seriously, because within 
seven hours (by 11:00 a.m. on December 25th) a Gadjah Command 
delegation, consisting of Gintings, Munthe and Major Nelang 
Sembiring, arrived in Pematang Siantar to talk to the twenty- 
seven. It was an interesting trio to be representing Simbolon1s 
cause9since Munthe and Sembiring were both close associates of 
Gintings and both, like him, were Karo; there were thus no true 
Simbolon supporters along. Nevertheless, if we can rely on 
our source here, the delegation did represent Simbolon, holding 
to his position during what must have been a rather searching 
confrontation with six representatives of the twenty-seven.
At 5:00 p.m., minds not having met, the Gintings delegation 
left and the six representatives went to see Makmour, to remind 
him that the Cabinet had instructed him to act against Simbolon 24
24. See Waspada, January 1, 1957, for text and list of signers, 
all but a few of whom were from the Second Regiment.
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if Gintings was unwilling to do so (as indeed Gintings had just 
shown himself) and also to repeat that they were going to act if 
Makmour would not.25 This may have been a genuine case of 
militant subordinates prodding a reluctant superior into action, 
something which has happened often enough in the history of the 
Indonesian army. On the other hand the general tenor of Makmour1s 
opinions and behavior in the following nine months,26 and his 
close association with several of the officers concerned, make 
it possible that he and the others had planned the thing to 
build up in this way,from background noise by the officer group 
to his open decision the next day. The evidence is inadequate, 
but the most plausible interpretation, I would say, is one between 
these extremes: close agreement on the issues between Makmour
and the others, but the initiative and some pressure coming from 
below.27
Makmour, at any rate, did come quickly into action. At 
1:00 p.m. on December 26th he announced that he had taken over 
command of TT-I. He based this action not only on the prior 
instructions from Djakarta but also on the argument that Simbolon 
had violated the December 4th Idea. Interestingly, he also set 
himself squarely against Gintings by stating that he was acting 
because Gintings "did not want" to carry out the Cabinet order.28 
It was only a matter of phrasing--Makmour had to show Gintings1
25. Waspada, February 8, 9, 1957. The source of this highly cir­
cumstantial information is not stated but is evidently from 
within the twenty-seven officer group, or at least sympathetic 
to it.
26. As I have already remarked, there is very little on Makmour 
from before December 22nd. Waspada, February 8, 1957, how­
ever, has him going to Medan on December 23rd to urge Gintings 
to take command, to urge Simbolon to abandon his enterprise 
and finally to tell Munthe that Gintings should make his 
position clear by December 26th. "Or else" is implied in 
this last, and if the report is accurate, Makmour was ready 
for action from almost the beginning.
27. Another factor which may have influenced Makmour, and must 
have strongly influenced others, was Sukarnofs Order of the 
Day on December 25th, which publicly backed up the Cabinet 
position. (The text can be found in PIA, January 22 (M), 
1957.) The Cabinet was a declining institution of the old 
regime and men may well have waited for stronger authority 
on which to act. Though not at all specific in content it 
is mentioned more often than the Cabinet decree of December 
22nd as the basis for men’s actions in reports during the 
following few weeks.
28. Text in Kempen, Kedjadian2 di Sumatera, pp. 70-71.
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inaction to justify his own action, though he need not have put 
it so bluntly--but it established at the very beginning an air 
of hostility between himself and Gintings.
After four long days of political maneuver and calculation 
Makmourfs public assumption of command brought resolution in 
swift action. Perhaps other anti-Simbolon factions had been 
planning to act and no doubt the public and well-documented 
events in Pematang Siantar since December 24th overshadow private 
and unreported doings in other corners. But on the published 
evidence, and indeed in the rhythm of events as they did occur, 
it was Makmourfs action which precipitated the showdown. One 
panglima might defy Djakarta for months or years--some did--but 
there could not long be two panglimas in one area. There might 
be fighting, Makmour or Simbolon might be ousted, those who pre­
ferred Gintings might hoist him into office provided they moved 
in time, but something had to happen, and quickly.
There are two published accounts of the Sapta Marga Operation, 
the counter-coup which overthrew Simbolon on the night of December 
26th/27th.29 They disagree on important points and it is best to 
begin by summarizing them in turn. The first comes from what are 
described as "authoritative military sources just returned to 
Djakarta from Medan."30 According to this version there were 
two groups opposing Simbolon:
1. The Second Regiment group, led by Captain Buwana.
2. A group headed by Sugiharto, including the commander 
of the TT-I field artillery battalion, Captain Hanafi 
Sutalaksana, and the commander of the TT-I cavalry 
(i.e., armored) squadron, Captain Tjuk Suwondo.
The story goes on to say that the Sugiharto group contacted 
the Second Regiment group and they agreed to mount a joint action 
in Medan on December 26th. This action was led by Makmour, who 
"later" announced that he had taken over command of TT-I.
On the insistence of Lt. Col. Sugiharto and other 
officers opposed to Simbolon, Lt. Col. Djamin 
Gintings was then forced to issue a communique that 
he had carried out the orders of the Army Chief of 
Staff and the government by ousting Col. Simbolon 
as commander of the TT-I. The announcement was backed
29. The Sapta Marga is the army loyalty oath. The Sapta Marga 
Operation is sometimes mixed up with the Sabang Merauke Opera­
tion, Nainggolanfs raid on Medan in March 1958, because the 
initials and general symbolic associations are the same, and 
because of punning associations--"satu marga" and so forth.
30. PIA, January 8 (M), 1957. Col. Gatot Subrotofs mission had 
just returned from Medan and this is presumably the origin 
of this report.
up by military activities carried out by the troops 
under Lt. Col. Makmour, the KMKB Medan troops led 
by Lt. Col. Sugiharto and reinforced by armored cars 
and tanks under the command of Captain Tjuk Suwondo.
The other version appears in Ali SastroamidjojoTs report to 
Parliament on January 21st.31
On December 26th at 10:00 p.m. Lt. Col. Sugiharto,
Major L. R. Munthe, Major [Ulung] Sitepu and others 
drew up the plan for the Sapta Marga Operation which 
was to be carried out on December 27th by putting in 
Battalion 137, Battalion 139, Cavalry Squadron V, and 
one company of Field Artillery [Battalion] II.32
The objective of the Sapta Marga Operation was to 
disarm Col. M. Simbolon and his men, on the under­
standing that bloodshed had to be avoided; should 
this not be possible,a total assault would be 
launched in order that the situation might be com­
pletely controlled.
As the units of Battalion 137, coming from Brastagi, 
were delayed— they had to occupy the police station 
and the telephone exchange at Pantjar Batu first—  
the Sapta Marga Operation could not be launched before 
4:00 a.m .
At 3:00 a.m. Col. Simbolon, because of the Sapta Marga 
Operation, left his house and then Medan, together 
with part of Batalion 132, for Prapat.
At 5:00 a.m. Major Munthe reported that the Sapta 
Marga Operation had completed the occupation of 
Medan.
At 6:00 a.m. Lt. Col. Djamin Gintings issued a state­
ment that he had assumed authority over TT-I.
Thus it happened that there were two acting commanders 
in one military district.
On the face of it these reports are hard to reconcile, not 
only in details, which is only to be expected, but in their main 
thrust. Ali Sastroamidjojo pictures a single harmonious Sapta
31. PIA, January 22 (M), 1957.
32. Battalion 137 was based in Kabupaten Tanah Karo; its commander 
was Captain Slamet Gintings (Karo). Battalion 139 was based 
in Kabupaten Langkat; its commander was Captain Liano
Siregar (Toba or Mandailing). Both of these were in the 
Second Regiment. Sitepu (Karo) was then the chief of staff 
of KMKB Medan.
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Marga Operation capped by an uncomplicated assumption of power 
by Djamin Gintings. The "authoritative source" shows a difficult 
pas de quatre: two distinct factions (Sugiharto1s and MakmourTs)
form a coalition, drive out Simbolon and then force a fourth 
person (Djamin Gintings) to assume office.
We can do little to clear up the differences of detail 
or to fill in gaps not covered by either source. But the dis­
agreement over the general picture of the event can be settled 
fairly easily. Ali achieves his picture of harmony mainly by 
giving no place at all in his story of the coup itself to MakmourTs 
Pematang Siantar group and by bringing in Makmour as rival panglima 
only at the very end, as an afterthought. This is consistent 
with Alifs treatment of the whole subject; earlier,in the same 
report to the DPR,he manages to quote the Cabinet order of 
December 22nd and describe the events between then and December 
26th without once mentioning the clause about Makmour. Ali had 
good reason to play down Makmourfs role in all this: his cabinet
had created the problem of the two panglimas in the first place, 
and he had an incentive, particularly in a public speech, to show 
that everything had gone off smoothly. We can confidently accept 
the "authoritative source’s" assertion that Makmour, Buwana and 
other officers from the Pematang Siantar group played an important 
part in the coup against Simbolon.33 34
We can also accept the general picture it gives of the situa­
tion as a fine geometrical tension of factions. It is harder to 
identify and describe the particular factions, however, and we 
might try to do so now. 3If
The only one of these factions mentioned in both versions 
above is the one around Sugiharto, and this is also the most 
homogeneous and easily defined. All three of the leading officers 
in this faction were ethnically non-Sumatran (Sugiharto and 
Suwondo were Javanese, Sutalaksana Sundanese) and seem never to 
have lived or served in Sumatra previously. Politically this 
meant that they had no obvious local constituency and were likely 
to look to Djakarta (specifically the army leadership under 
Nasution) for support, and to operate in its behalf. They were
33. For independent corroboration of this group’s participation, 
see also Waspada, February 9, 1957, which reports the seizure 
of the Medan radio station by troops under Captain Rusli, the 
commander of Battalion 133 (which was always the closest to 
Makmour) and one of the six representatives who had met 
Gintings in Pematang Siantar on December 25th. Cf. also 
PIA, January 2 (M), 1957.
34. In the following I pretend an equivalence between an officer 
and the unit he commands, so that I will sometimes say that 
one of our sources mentions a particular officer, when in 
fact it only mentions the unit, or vice versa. This is not 
wholly sound but saves endless qualifications.
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also all located in Medan--Sugiharto commanding the KMKB, the 
others commanding division-level special units— a circumstance 
which gave them disproportionately strong political leverage.
A second faction was the one forming around Makmour in 
Pematang Siantar, whose earlier activities we have been follow­
ing. It is harder to characterize a large group like this, 
roughly defined by the twenty-seven names of those who signed 
the December 24th resolution, except to say that those names 
show that it was mainly Sumatran but thoroughly mixed in its 
ethnic composition, and that the resolution itself suggests a 
"young officer" militance. But if we stick to the six officers 
who represented the twenty-seven in the December 25th parley 
with Gintings35 and the overlapping group of six officers reported 
to have been sought for disciplinary action by the Gadjah Com­
mand late on the 26th36--along with Makmour himself--we can get 
a clearer picture. As a group they strike one as the type of 
army officer formed by the experience and ideals of the perdjuangan: 
populist, nationalist, militant.37 Outside the army this officer 
type found an exact equivalent in the pedjuang, and its thinking 
a less exact equivalent in that of the PKI (and Murba). It is 
worth noting, in the light of these affinities, that two of these 
men (Makmour at the time, Maliki later) were accused of being 
Communists, that Makmour made common cause with the PKI on a 
number of important East Sumatran issues in 1957, that several 
of these officers (notably Buwana) had a following among local 
pedjuang dating from Revolutionary days, and that Makmour^ most 
controversial policy during 1957 was his arming of pedjuang (and 
Sarbupri members) in a village guard. In the political context 
of the time Makmour's faction was pro-Djakarta and anti-daerahist 
like the Sugiharto faction, but in its ideological and political 
style, and also in its local connections, it was very different 
indeed.
The other two factions— SimbolonTs and Gintings1— are more 
obvious, but at the same time pose two special difficulties.
First, they were formed around two successive panglimas of TT-I. 
These officers held a very important position, and it is not 
always easy to distinguish their supporters in a faction sense
35. Captains R. T. Gintings (Karo), Langlang Buwana, Maliki (Javanese) 
and Rusli (?); Lieutenants Djakat Silalahi and Pandak Tarigan 
(Karo).
36. The first three of the above and also Captains Turangan 
(Menadonese) and Zein Hamid:and Lieutenant Gindo Bangko.
37. The tone of their thinking is suggested by a further statement
launched by the six representatives at Djamin Gintings in the 
confrontation on December 25th: that the program to be followed
should be one acceptable to Sukarno and one which would serve the 
interests of the whole Indonesian people, not just daerah interests 
(kepentingan daerah). Waspada, February 9, 1957.
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from officers who worked closely with them simply in the course 
of duty, or out of a practical respect for their power. Second, 
these factions both had a strong suku basis. This does not mean, 
however, that all Toba officers ipso facto supported Simbolon or 
all Karo officers Gintings. More important, one must guard 
against the temptation to suppose that all officers of the one 
or the other suku who did support the panglima of the same suku 
were necessarily doing so for that reason.
In Simbolonfs case the success of the counter-coup and his 
flight to Tapanuli provide plenty of evidence as to who his 
true supporters, mostly Toba, were: officers like Samosir and
the dozen or so others, who either went to Tapanuli with him or 
were removed from office by Gintings immediately afterwards.
No such concrete evidence of allegiance is available in Gintings1 
case (or the other two, for that matter), and the membership of 
his faction is the most difficult to specify. Of the officers 
active in the affairs of December we may tentatively assign 
Sembiring, Munthe, Ulung Sitepu and Slamet Gintings, all Karo, 
to a Gintings faction and leave it at that for the time being.38
From this tour of the military factions of East Sumatra as 
they were in late December 1956,it is evident that they were 
only rough groupings, with membership and basic viewpoints (ex­
cept where suku was concerned) only approximately definable. It 
is also evident that they were formed around the four officers 
occupying the highest positions in the area (Simbolon and 
Gintings in succession in the same office, of course). These 
two observations taken together suggest that one must visualize 
a general pool of crosscutting opinions and personal interests 
in this deeply divided area and then see factions, not as stable 
and clearcut institutions, but as partial and temporary alignments 
of these opinions and interests in a pattern determined largely 
by who it was who happened to occupy these powerful offices at 
a given moment. With this idea in mind we can return to the 
narrative.
Before Simbolon launched his coup on the morning of December 
22nd, the situation in North Sumatra was normal. Routine pre­
vailed, power relationships were changing,but still slowly; a 
soldier could go to bed at night knowing that the same commanding 
officer would be giving him orders the next morning. Simbolon1s
38. Munthe, Sitepu and Slamet Gintings all played parts in the 
counter-coup, according to Ali Sastroamidjojo. Waspada, 
December 29, 1956 reports that Slamet Gintings! Battalion 137 
took over guard duties at TT-I headquarters after the counter- 
coup. PIA, January 4 (M), 1957, quotes Haluan (Padang) as 
listing Slamet Gintings, Sitepu and Munthe as particularly 
active in the military politics of the period.
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coup cracked this routine; by temporarily lifting the weight of 
central government authority off the area’s back, he opened up 
the political situation. A severe strain was put on all exist­
ing power relationships. For a few days the inertia of his con­
tinued command of TT-I kept these more or less intact, but his 
power began to drain away almost from the moment he made his 
break. By the 26th, the situation had reached the point, so 
familiar in history, at which the superstructure of political 
life seems suddenly to dissolve, leaving society stripped down 
for a time to more basic relationships,while men leap almost 
frantically into action to build a new superstructure.
For almost a week after Makmourfs announcement on the 26th, 
the situation in East Sumatra and Tapanuli was politically and 
militarily open. In describing what was going on I have had and 
will have to break the material into sections; it is thus almost 
impossible to convey the impression which the reports of the 
period give of the scattering of power into small units all over 
the map and all through a wide range of political positions, and 
then of the clumping together once more of these units, re-forming 
into larger and more coherent shapes. All around the area in 
that week officers were being arrested, civilians were being 
armed and disarmed, small units of troops marched and made announce­
ments, committees met and candidates for power sought support.
And underneath it all was the fear on all sides that the situation 
might slide from military politics into suku war.
When Simbolon fled Medan early in the morning of the 27th 
with a hundred or more men from Battalion 132, he naturally head­
ed for Tapanuli. On his way, by Pemantang Siantar, he tried to 
persuade the cadets and officers of the SKI (Infantry Cadre 
School) there to join his cause, but he was forestalled by 
Makmour, and had to continue on his way to Prapat, a resort town 
on Lake Toba, leaving behind a spate of arrests and disarmings 
by Makmour. At Prapat, just inside Second Regiment territory, 
he was met by Major Samosir with troops from the Third Regiment.39
During the next few days it seemed possible that there might 
be fighting between the Second and Third Regiments. Samosir was 
encroaching on Second Regiment soil at Prapat and Makmour threaten­
ed to attack if he did not leave. Both gave out arms to a few 
hundred civilian supporters and may have fostered the rumors 
current at the time that thousands more had been armed. AURI 
planes,freshly sent up to Medan,buzzed Tapanuli as a warning.
But both sides played the game of military politics quite pro­
perly according to the established rules of that day, and the 
only thing which might have passed for real trouble was what
39. For a report on Simbolon’s efforts with the SKI and MakmourTs 
countermeasures, see Waspada, December 31, 1956. For a 
nice vignette see Waspada, January 1, 1957.
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Samosir later reported as one incident "short of a clash." And 
soon Simbolon and Samosir— who had no reason to remain forever 
in Prapat, provoking Makmour, once hope of a comeback coup had 
faded— retreated by slow stages across the border and deeper into 
Tapanuli.1*0 For Nasution on January 2nd to order the Second and 
Third Regiments to keep the peace along the border was quite 
unnecessary; by that time the danger of fighting had passed, the 
situation had hardened again and politics could move back up to 
a higher level.
It was also useless for Gintings on December 29th to offer 
a 7-day period of grace for all men who had left their posts to 
return, before being stamped as deserters. Men loyal to 
Simbolon, mostly Toba in this case, who could retreat to the 
newly-forming independent area of Tapanuli, had no reason to 
return. Indeed on Gintings* part,the offer was presumably mostly 
a matter of form; at heart, as the agent of anti-Toba forces in 
East Sumatra, he could not have felt much pain at seeing Toba 
returning to Tapanuli. When on January 3rd he ordered Samosir 
to report to Medan, he also presumably had little expectation 
of being obeyed.
Meanwhile, the situation in Tapanuli, only indirectly 
disturbed by what was going on in East Sumatra, was taking a new 
shape. On December 31st, Samosir, who now had Simbolon alongside 
him, announced that he was putting the Third Regiment directly 
under Chief of Staff Nasution and that he no longer considered 
himself to be responsible to the commander of TT-I. A few days 
later,Dr. F. L. Tobing emerged from retirement to head the list 
of signers of a telegram to Sukarno and Gintings explaining that 
Samosir could not obey Gintings1 summons to Medan because of the 
uneasy situation in Tapanuli. Tobing, the most prestigeful Toba 
Revolutionary leader, symbolized a strong and united Tapanuli; 
when he came into action again, people inside and outside the 
residency knew that the relations between Tapanuli and the 
central government had changed. A few days later he headed a 
delegation to Djakarta to talk to Nasution and others, and on 
February 12th he became the head of the newly set up "Tapanuli 
August 17th Proclamation Council."
Tapanuli, in fact, was beginning to go the way of the other 
daerah and, like Huseinfs Fourth Regiment area before it, more or 
less disappeared as a factor on the East Sumatra military scene. 
On February 12th it got its Revolutionary Youth Command, late in 
October its Tapanuli Reconstruction Movement. There were occa­
sional signs during the year of friction across the old cleavage 
line, Christian North vs. Moslem South, but the published 40
40. Some of the details are in Waspada, January 3, 1957, and 
PIA, January 14 (M, A), 1957. The whole question of the 
arming of the civilians is discussed later.
references at least make it sound less serious than one would sus­
pect from a knowledge of the history of the Revolution in Tapanuli. 
Publicly anyway, Tapanuli faced outward as a united front and it 
got the same soft treatment the government had accorded the 
Banteng Council’s united West Sumatra earlier. It appears to 
have been given important financial and other advantages;k1 
when Nasution, after ten months of delicate maneuvers, succeeded 
in replacing Samosir, the new commander of the Third Regiment 
proved to be a Toba Batak and already a member of the Tapanuli 
Reconstruction Movement.1’2
Simbolon’s flight to Tapanuli and the danger of fighting 
between the Second and Third Regiments represented tension along 
one axis of the faction pattern, the Simbolon-Makmour one. During 
these same days Makmour and Gintings were also involved in a 
tense situation rising out of the fact that each had proclaimed 
himself panglima. The very fact that the week between the appear­
ance of this interesting problem and its solution on January 3rd 
was garnished with statements by all concerned that no problem 
existed is the best evidence to the contrary.
Makmour made it plain that he would not easily and automat­
ically give up the strong position which he had obtained by 
announcing his assumption of command, in perfect accord with the 
Cabinet order of December 22nd, some eighteen hours before 
Gintings had. For a few days it seemed possible that he might 
try to maintain his claim on the office. At the same time he 
kept up the appearance of perfect compliance. On the 28th he 
distributed a leaflet in Medan in which he disclaimed any ambi­
tion to be panglima, demanding only a clarification of the situa­
tion. Not that the matter was very difficult, he indicated, in 
fact it could be solved easily: it was all in the hands of the
central government authorities--a posture which, given the situa­
tion, suggested that he would not yield easily. 3 In an inter­
view on December 31st he repeated his argument, denying any 
friction with Gintings or that he wanted the post, but saying that 
ffthe central government should be clear about this matter and 
must establish whether the assumption of command which was pro­
claimed in Siantar is admitted or not, because I too have carried 4123
41. Thus, for one example, Sibolga was declared an ocean port 
(i.e., elevated from the status of coastal trade port) on 
October 26th. Waspada, November 1, 1957.
42. He was Major Sahala Hutabarat. Nasution had used him as his 
intermediary in much of his negotiations with Samosir and 
Simbolon. The parallel here with Dahlan Djambek is striking 
and suggests a good deal about the Indonesian style of 
negotiations.
43. Waspada, January 2, 1957.
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out the government policy [of December 22nd].fflflt
In a context in which Gintings* position was compromised 
by his partial or seeming collaboration with Simbolon and by 
the fact that he had been rescued mainly if not entirely by 
others, this was an ominous line. The Government statement 
broadcast the next day, January 1st, though it said clearly that 
Makmour must yield place to Gintings, ‘showed signs of weakness 
by the praise it lavished on him and particularly by the fact 
that it declared that all his acts while he was self-proclaimed 
panglima were legal.1*5 Whatever the practical significance 
of this— as regards his arming of civilians, for example--the 
atmosphere of the transaction showed plainly that Makmour was 
a power to be reckoned with henceforth in East Sumatra.
Satisfied by this concession, and perhaps by others un­
revealed, Makmour went through a ceremony on January 3rd in 
which he handed over authority over TT-I to Gintings. Pre­
sumably he had not really expected to be able to hold onto 
the office, but he had certainly used his claim shrewdly to 
enhance his prestige.
A third axis in the faction pattern, Gintings-Simbolon, 
was also a source of tension in this period, and here the 
issue can be brought down clearly to a base in suku antagonisms. 
Where Makmour was involved, the issues were personal hostility 
(in the case of Simbolon), rivalry for command of TT-I and 
potential socio-economic conflict (in the case of Gintings), 
and in both cases, above all, national unity versus daerahism 
(to be sure, resting in part on Toba and Karo sukuism respec­
tively) . But the friction between Simbolon and Gintings was 
quite simply the friction between Toba and Karo,and it was on 
this axis of faction conflict that men felt the danger of 
suku fighting. The week at the turn of the new year saw a 
sudden growth of peace committees of elders, formed to calm 
down the passions of the young; the alim ulama of Medan, 
Governor Pontas, and Regent Salamuddin of Simalungun all formed 
such committees in this period, in the teeth of the official 
line, subscribed to by all concerned, that there were no signs 
of suku tensions. Perhaps the line was substantially right, 
after all, and perhaps Pontas was exaggerating when he 
said later that there had been widespread fear in Medan on 
the 27th and that many people had fled the town that day lest 
they be caught in a clash between Gintings and Simbolon. But 
the open situation left scope for latent antagonism to find 
its way to the surface; the emotions, for example, which led 
200 Christian Batak students at the Police Training School in 
Tandjung Kasau to evacuate their barracks on the 29th and 45
44. Waspada, January 1, 1957.
45. Waspada, January 3, 1957, and PIA, January 2 (M), 3 (A), 1957, 
give most of the details of the various announcements from 
Djakarta.
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disappear to Tapanuli cannot be underestimated.1*6
Nevertheless it is important to assess the intentions of the 
higher level participants in these struggles. There is no evi­
dence that any of them wanted to fight. If we are to believe 
all the reports5 Toba civilians. Communist plantation workers, 
Karo pedjuang, and citizens of Medan were all armed by their 
military representatives, and troops were marshalled and marched 
here and there. But all this was done in the interest of 
political maneuver and by the rules of the game--everyone wanted 
a bloodless victory.h7 Fighting might have begun by accident, 
and if it had,the situation might have exploded, as at Madiun in 
1948. But fighting was no part of the conscious intentions of 
the leaders, and their intentions were borne out by a rich har­
vest of political change,but no bloodshed.
After January 3rd, routine of a kind was restored, though 
it never regained the fixity which it had had before Simbolonfs 
coup. Considering how little time had passed and the fact that 
there had been no violence, it is perhaps surprising how great 
a change there was in the distribution of power in TT-I. The 
Fourth Regiment of Central Sumatra had passed completely.out of 
its old orbit. Major Gaharu had taken advantage of the Govern­
ment’s difficulty with Simbolon to pull the First Regiment and 
Atjeh off into partial independence. On December 31st he fol­
lowed up the precedent created by the Cabinet decree of December 
22nd placing the First Regiment directly under the Army Chief of 
Staff--but only temporarily--by declaring that the First Regiment 
would no longer recognize the authority of TT-I.k8 A week later 
he announced that the First Regiment had been transformed into 
the KDM Atjeh (Komando Daerah Militer Atjeh--thus an autonomous 
entity); in mid-January he publicly discarded the TT-I lentjana 4678
46. For the police students, see Waspada  ^ January 2, 1957. Mimbar 
Umum (Medan weekly), December 30, 1956, gives the text of
a leaflet dropped by Gintings over Pematang Siantar and Prapat 
during Simbolonfs retreat towards Tapanuli. It is consider­
ably less restrained than the various statements (intended for 
a wider public, including Djakarta) made by Gintings in Medan 
around this time, and hints at the likelihood of reprisals if 
Simbolon should try to recapture control of East Sumatra. A 
later news story (PIA, January 11 (A), 1957), which says that 
1 certain military agencies" had distributed arms to civilians 
"shortly after" (my emphasis) December 27th, helps to under­
line the fact that the successful coup against Simbolon marked 
the beginning rather than the end of the danger of suku (and 
other) fighting.
47. PIA, January 11 (A), 1957, carried some shrewd remarks by 
Het Vrije Volk on this point.
48. PIA, January 1 (M), 1957 ( Radio Kutaradja).
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(emblem) and announced a new one for the KDM Atjeh.1*9 Gintings 
fought back on behalf of TT-I and for a few weeks there was a 
running technical quarrel about whether or not Atjeh was tactical­
ly under the Army Chief of Staff, but organically and administra­
tively under TT-I and things like that. But in the existing 
situation Gaharufs initiative was irresistible; at the all- 
Sumatra Army conference in Palembang in late January he was 
recognized as what he claimed to be, commander of an autonomous 
KDM Atjeh, and he was formally installed as such on March 30th.* 50 51
Meanwhile,Gaharu used his newly strong position and his 
doubly legitimate authority as both an Atjehnese and the local 
Army commander to improve the situation inside Atjeh. He operated 
throughout in the "legitimate” style, and his accomplishments have 
attracted less attention than the more dramatic and defiant doings 
of some of his counterparts in this period. Briefly,he achieved 
four main things for Atjeh during 1957. First, he compelled 
Djakarta to arrange for the return of at least one of the two 
battalions of Atjehnese troops serving outside Atjeh (Battalion 
706 from Sulawesi), with the consequent removal of some of the 
non-Atjehnese units previously serving there. Second, he played 
a large part in arranging for Atjeh to be promoted from a 
residency inside the province of North Sumatra to a province in 
its own right, with a Governor (an Atjehnese, Ali Hasjmy) of its 
own. Third, he extracted economic concessions from Djakarta, such 
as the application of the 70:30 foreign exchange formula to Atjeh. 
Finally, and perhaps most important, he used all these and the 
prestige and funds accruing to him from them to engineer a cease­
fire in the Daud Beureueh rebellion in June 1957.
The position of Tapanuli, too, had changed drastically, but 
along somewhat different lines. In many ways it was going the 
way of Central Sumatra and Atjeh; it had its own loyal military 
force, the Third Regiment, and we have already seen how it developed 
a form of daerah movement during 1957. But there was this differ­
ence: the Third Regiment did not achieve formal separation from
M-9. On KDM Atjeh see PIA, January 8 (A), 1957, and Harian Rakjat, 
January 8, 1957 (Radio Kutaradja, January 7) with the TT-I 
response. On the lentjana, see Waspada, January 29, 1957.
50. The Palembang conference (January 29-31) is covered in 
Waspada, February 7, 1957, among others. For GaharuTs in­
stallation see PIA, April 1 (M), 1957, which also reports 
the same for Husem as commander of the new KDM Sumatra 
Tengah.
51. For an example of how this sort of thing was handled, see 
Waspada, March 9, 1957, citing Pedoman, March 7, 1957, 
stating that Gaharu had set up a Council to carry on barter 
trade from Atjeh. The proceeds, says the story, were to go
to the Dana Pembangunan (Construction Fund) in Atjeh to finance 
the penampungan (job resettlement) of pedjuang and to buy off 
Daud Beureueh.
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TT-I and remained throughout under the nominal command of Medan.52 
In practical terms this made little differences since Samosir 
(with Simbolon behind him) was hardly amenable to orders from 
Gintings, and one might be tempted to think that it was a ques­
tion of form alone. But underlying the nominal connection was 
the real sociological one, the vested interest in East Sumatra 
represented by the half million Toba and substantial numbers of 
Mandailing living there. Whatever the accidents of circumstances 
and personalities which prevented the emergence of a KDM Tapanuli-- 
the record is not clear on this point— the fact remained that 
Tapanuli could never retire into the pure daerahism of Minangkabau 
or Atjeh.
This complicating factor, cogent as it was, nevertheless 
manifested itself in the ensuing months chiefly in the field of 
civilian politics— the autonomy movement to be discussed below—  
rather than directly in military politics. After January 3rd 
the Third Regiment as such was as remote from Medan and the 
TT-I command as were the Fourth and First Regiments. All that 
was left of the old TT-I, then, was the units actually stationed 
in the residency of East Sumatra: the Second Regiment, the
KMKB Medan and a few special units. Here the kind of solution 
which Husein and Gaharu had reached in their areas and which 
Samosir had approximated in his was impossible. Their areas 
were ethnically, religiously and ecnomically more or less homo­
geneous and hence, for them, daerah feeling was a valid organizing 
principle. In East Sumatra, on the other hand, this kind of 
sentiment was not a unifying,but a disruptive force. And so 
military politics in East Sumatra, under an inevitably less well 
entrenched military leadership and in a time of national crisis, 
remained tense.
In the new balance of power which emerged inside East 
Sumatra after Simbolon had been pushed out to Tapanuli and 
Makmour had dropped his claim to be panglima, we can see a nice 
balance of the three factions. Gintings held nominal power 
with the advantage which formal position carries, and he had 
many supporters among the officers of TT-I and, outside the army, 
among anti-Toba and pro-autonomy groups. But he did not have 
the kind of authority a panglima might normally expect, even 
within East Sumatra, all that was left of the old TT-I. Mili­
tary action by Makmour and Sugiharto had played a decisive role—  
while he laid low--in toppling Simbolon, and political action by 
Djakarta had ensured that he, not Makmour, would be panglima.
The Second Regiment and KMKB Medan, the only two major units 
under his command, were very largely controlled by Makmour and 
Sugiharto. All this was reflected in the formal aspect of his 
position and in other matters in which higher authorities were
52. It was the same in the world of civil administration. 
Tapanuli remained a residency in the province of North 
Sumatra.
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involved. For one thing he was for the time being only a pedjabat 
(acting) panglima, a designation which in the Indonesian military 
and civil hierarchies has always meant either that the appoint­
ing authorities have some reservations about a man53 * or that 
they are waiting to see whether he will prove himself, but 
which in any case implies lesser authority. Moreover, his formal 
installation as pedjabat panglima was delayed by protracted 
negotiations until March 25th. From January he had a non-TT-I 
officer, Lt. Col. Hasan Kasim--in effect a representative of 
Nasution--as his chief of staff, and this arrangement was con­
tinued after his formal installation in office, though Kasim 
was later transferred to South Sumatra for similar duties.
Finally, the Palembang conference created a special new com­
mittee, the Staf Penghubung (Liaison Staff) to preside over the 
disintegration of the old TT-I. The Staf Penghubung, which met 
in Medan, consisted of the commanders of the four former regiments 
of TT-I (two of them being detached to become KDM) and of KMKB 
Medan, and had as its (rotating) chairman not Gintings,but one 
of the Army Deputy Chiefs of Staff. In this way direct communica­
tion between Army Headquarters and the sub-TT-I commanders was 
maintained.5  ^ One might think, surveying all these derogations 
of Gintings’ authority, that he had nothing left. It would be 
more accurate to say that taken,all together*they had the effect 
of reducing him to something very much like equality with his 
rivals,who were occupying what were normally much less important 
positions.
The place of Makmour and Sugiharto in the triangle requires 
less comment. Makmour had a strong base in Pematang Siantar, 
associations with pedjuang and Sarbupri which he was to develop 
further in the coming months, strong support in Battalion 133 
in Tebing Tinggi, rather less influence to the north and among 
the other battalions of the regiment. Sugiharto had risen rapidly 
in importance during the events of late December and probably 
had a stronger position in his own area, Medan, than either of 
the other two did in theirs. It is noticeable that he played no 
open part in the factional disputes immediately after the counter­
coup, but he had a major role ahead of him in the events of the 
year to come.
Besides the three main factions there are two other factors 
we must keep in mind. In the first place we cannot ignore the 
existence of Toba and supporters of Simbolon within the army in 
East Sumatra, nor the fact that the Toba element did not evaporate
53. In this connection one should keep in mind that the original 
idea, before December 22nd even, appears to have been for 
Gintings to be only a caretaker panglima, while the search 
for a permanent replacement for Simbolon continued.
5*+. For some of the details of this arrangement see Waspada, 
February 4, 7 and March 1, 1957; PIA, February 9, 19S7 
(press summary).
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from East Sumatran society simply because Simbolon had been 
ousted. Toba officers, like Captain Henry Siregar (commander of 
Battalion 131 in Medan), remained in high positions in the army, 
and we will see some indications of their re-emergence in Octo­
ber. In the second place, it is evident that the even balance 
of factions in East Sumatra, as the situation began to stabilize 
after Simbolon1s ouster, made it easier for Army Headquarters, 
and Nasution in particular, to exert an unusually great degree 
of influence. The evidence is there in the preceding descrip­
tions, and we shall see as we go through 1957 how strong that 
influence was on this divided scene.
The period between January and mid-year 1957 has few high­
lights in East Sumatran affairs. Instead of "events," it is 
marked by long-drawn-out struggles over certain issues. These 
I will take up in turn, though, in fact, they developed simul­
taneously .
On the level of national politics, there was an inter­
minable series of more or less private negotiations between 
Nasution (or his representatives) and local commanders. At the 
same time, there was a succession of well-publicized military 
conferences concerned with the reorganization of the army and 
all the various problems involved in military administration 
under the state of war and siege introduced on March 14th. In 
the one case, Nasution was working to strengthen his own posi­
tion in the army; in the other, he and the delegates to the con­
ferences were together trying to work out the forms and pro­
cedures by which military administration could be carried out 
effectively and the army, as an entity, consolidate its power. 
These were interesting and important developments, but it is 
difficult to follow their operation in East Sumatra. In the 
relatively simple situation that prevailed in Tapanuli, for 
example, we can watch Nasution, like a mouse under a rug, moving 
slowly toward his goal of replacing Samosir with a man somewhat 
more amenable to his control. In the jumble of East Sumatra, 
however, Nasutionfs political maneuverings are almost impossible 
to follow. Likewise, we can follow economic policy and the 
operation of military administration in Atjeh or Central Sumatra 
because daerahism provides a framework in which to see it. In 
East Sumatra, the perpetual dance of military factions in the 
foreground obscures these other less spectacular developments. 
Moreover, the very fact that East Sumatra, unlike the other 
areas of the old TT-I, was still divided within itself appears 
to have resulted in its being unable to extract major economic 
concessions from the central government.55 It likewise meant
55. As far as I know, East Sumatra was the only area in Sumatra 
which was not carrying on some barter trade, either official­
ly or with official connivance, by mid-1957.
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that much less power was concentrated in the hands of the Military 
Administrator (under martial law), so that what was elsewhere a 
significant development in political organization was in East 
Sumatra a rather stunted growth. Thus there is simply less to 
report on this level.
Down inside the cockpit of East Sumatra, however, the ten­
sions intrinsic to the area began to work themselves out in the 
new political situation created by the coup and the counter-coup 
of December 1956. Before turning to the two central issues in 
which the main military factions became embroiled, we should 
look at one perennial East Sumatran dispute which bubbled furi­
ously during 1957 without apparently involving these military 
factions themselves. This was the squatter question, a massive 
tangle in which resentful foreign plantation interests, a cen­
tral government eager for foreign exchange but acutely sensitive 
to charges of betraying Revolutionary ideals, and different groups 
of squatters— Toba and non-Toba, unorganized and organized in 
rival peasant unions— fought each other passionately but incon­
clusively. The issue was, if anything, sharpened in 1957, as 
Indonesia1s deepening economic difficulties persuaded Djakarta 
to try a tougher anti-squatter policy, embodied in the Emergency 
Law of October 1956, and as the SOB (martial law) decree of 
March 1957 gave the military new powers to enforce it or new 
responsibility for not doing so. The consequence, in East 
Sumatra, was simply a more unpleasant continuation of the exist­
ing impasse: an unbroken invasion by new squatters and a wave
of warnings, arrests and expulsions by the military authorities, 
stronger than usual but still short of an all-out drive. But in 
all this--the newspapers in the middle months of 1957 are full 
of stories about squatting incidents— there is no evidence that 
Gintings, Makmour and Sugiharto had different policies on the 
squatting question or quarrelled over it.
Two major issues, however, did cause mounting tension between 
these factions during the first half of 1957. One of these was 
the establishment and arming of an OPD (Organisasi Pengawal Desa) 
in the Second Regiment area. The problem was partly a simple 
matter of military strength, since the OPD was a large auxiliary 
formation and had access to weapons; behind this, however, lay 
a number of deep-rooted social conflicts— urgent claims of former 
pedjuang; disputes over how to deal with the problems created by 
gerombolan (armed gangs, in which there were often many former 
pedjuang); and the political and economic goals of Sarbupri, 
many of whose members were in the OPD.
The history of the OPD in East Sumatra goes back to the 
week or two following Simbolon’s coup on December 2 2 , 1956. At 
that time, during the military maneuvers which accompanied the 
fall of Simbolon and the establishment of a new balance of power 
in the area, all parties to the struggle seem to have distributed 
arms to supporters outside the regular military units. This much
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is clear enough, but beyond this the facts are obscured by the 
vigorous controversy which surrounded the issue and provided 
most of the available published evidence. It is certain, how­
ever, that, despite their various denials, Makmour, Samosir and 
Sugiharto, or their supporters, did distribute weapons and that 
others probably did so as well.56 Despite rumors that as many 
as 5,000 men were so armed in Tapanuli and 2,000 in the Simelungun 
area (by Makmour), it seems likely that the numbers actually 
given weapons at this time were considerably smaller, nearer the 
one hundred in East Sumatra mentioned by Munthe and Zein Hamid 
or the one hundred and fifty which the hostile Medan newspaper 
Lembaga claimed had been armed by Makmour.57 The larger figures, 
if they are more than just fearful rumors at a time when fight­
ing seemed possible or large numbers put about to overawe oppon­
ents, may represent guesses at the numbers of men who volunteered 
or who were assured they would be called upon if necessary.58 
As to who precisely the men armed were, it seems probable, 
despite many reports that they were simply !!civilians,fT that 
most were former pedjuang.59 Finally--a point of special impor­
tance in view of the later controversy over the OPD— it seems
56. A Haluan (Padang) story, rendered in PIA, January 4 (M), 1957, 
claims that different groups, respectively those of Djamin 
Gintings and Slamet Gintings (with Ulung Sitepu), had armed 
former pedjuang supporters, and that Munthe had recruited 
members of the old Barisan Pengawal of the Negara Sumatera 
Timur.
57. The large figures are from Waspada, January 3, 1957. The 
Munthe and Hamid claim is in Harian Rakjat, January 5 , 1957, 
and PIA, January 14 (A), 1957. It is not clear whether they 
mean m  all of East Sumatra, just in the Simelungun area, or 
even in all of TT-I. The Lembaga figure is reported in 
Harian Rakjat, January 4, 1957.
58. Several sources make this distinction between those actually
armed and those who volunteered spontaneously: see Munthe
and Hamid,as cited in n. 57; the press officer of TT-I in 
Harian Rakjat, January 7, 1957 and PIA, January 7 (M), 1957; 
and a spokesman for the Second Regiment in Waspada, January 
4, 1957.
59. For specific mention of former pedjuang see Harian Rakjat,
January 7, 1957, and Waspada, January 4, 1957. For mention 
of former members of the army see Waspada, January 19, 1957,
PIA, January 22 (M), 1957, Harian Rakjat, January 15, 1957,
and Bintang Timur, January 25, 1957. See also Ali Sastroamidjojo 
in his replies to questions in the first term general DPR 
debates on the Sumatra question, February 4th, and the second 
term ones, February 13th, Kempen, Djawaban Pemerintah atas 
Pemandangan Umum, Babak ke-I DPR ... mengenai keterangan 
Pemerintah tentang kedjadian2 di Sumatera bulan Desember 1956,
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clear that a substantial proportion of those armed or volunteering 
to be armed by Makmour in Simelungun were Sarbupri members as 
well as being former pedjuang and/or men on reserve lists.60
These vexing questions of fact may partly obscure the under­
lying importance of what was really happening: a quick and
general intimation of danger which led large numbers of men to 
volunteer to fight and induced various army officers in the area 
to arm many of them in a very short space of time. Still, were 
it not for the later history of the OPD, we could tuck this away 
as just a revealing insight into the psychological pressures felt 
in the fluid situation created by Simbolonfs coup. Indeed, 
official voices in mid-January were saying something very much 
like that. On January 10th, Sugiharto ordered civilians to 
return the arms they had received by January 24th. On January 
18th, Gintings, admitting that arms had been distributed to 
civilians in Siantar, assured a press conference that the matter 
was now settled. On January 21st, Ali Sastroamidjojo told the 
DPR that Nasution had ordered the return of these weapons and 
that this order was "now being carried out." 61
January 21st, however, was also the day on which Makmour 
issued a decree establishing an OPD in the Second Regiment 
area, that is, the Residency of East Sumatra.62 He could 
probably not have done this entirely on his own authority, and 
indeed, later, after the formal public establishment of the OPD, 
TT-I headquarters stated that Gintings had issued instructions 
for the formation of 0PDfs by all regimental commanders in TT-I.63
p. 48 and Babak ke-II, p. 11. In several of these sources 
the former soldiers are said to be classified as having 
B III status— in effect a kind of reserve formation or list.
60. Claimed by Lembaga (see Harian Rakjat, January 4, 1957); 
denied by the press officer of TT-I CPIA, January 7 (M),
1957, and again Bintang Timur, January 25, 1957); see also 
the conflicting versions of a statement by Sugiharto in 
Waspada, January 3, 1957, and Harian Rakjat, January 4, 1957; 
the denial by a spokesman for the Second Regiment that they 
were armed because they were Sarbupri (i.e., the implicit 
admission that that is what they were) in Waspada, January 4, 
1957. I have substantially revised my original views on this 
question as a result of suggestions from Ruth McVey.
61. See, respectively, PIA? January 11 (A), 1957; Waspada, January 
19, 1957, and PIA, January 22 (M), 1957.
62. These instructions were for internal purposes (their date comes 
from Waspada, March 13, 1957). The first public announcement 
of the OPD was on February 3rd (Waspada, February 4, 1957).
63. Waspada, February 15, 1957. No date is mentioned for these 
instructions by Gintings. Presumably he issued them before
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But the public history of the OPD was all Makmour and no Gintings; 
we are justified in assuming that whatever formal authorization 
Gintings may have given, enthusiastically or not, the initiative 
had from the beginning come from Makmour. Makmour certainly had 
stronger reasons than Gintings for wanting an OPD. Most obvious­
ly, an organization like this, under his command, with thousands 
of members spread throughout East Sumatra, could not but enhance 
his prestige and power. The OPD members were auxiliaries with 
limited access to arms and little training, but they certainly 
had some military potential. Command over them gave him consid­
erable patronage, if only through appointment. Running the OPD 
gave him a channel for politically useful contacts with Sarbupri 
and former pedjuang leaders. Finally, it gave him much publicity 
in an attractive role.6^
A second set of reasons is less easy to demonstrate but may 
have been even more important. On the basis of his record as we 
know it, from November 19 56, his style was definitely that of an 
"ideological” rather than a "professional” army officer, the 
kind who considered his proper role to be out in the larger 
society organizing anti-gambling drives, tearing down squatters1 
shacks to clean up Siantar, and leading a mass organization like 
the OPD rather than back on the base making up training schedules.64 5 
Makmour must, moreover, have been reinforced in this conception 
of his role, and specifically in organizing the OPD, by similar 
attitudes among his officer supporters in Siantar. Indeed, if 
it is true, as I have suggested, that these subordinates exerted 
pressure on him to declare himself panglima on December 26th, 
it is likely that they would have been urging him to establish 
an OPD.
There are two more factors to consider. One is the ques­
tion of timing. Makmour had stepped forward in a heroic role 
on December 26th, had elicted a warm response among the volun­
teers and had armed substantial numbers of them. He had a strong 
incentive to maintain this momentum, to hold onto his new followers
January 21st, but conceivably this story is an effort to 
cover up a fait accompli by Makmour.
64. Individual members of the OPD were not paid but might be 
given surplus uniforms and were, in any case, being rewarded 
with local prestige and some local authority. Civilian lead­
ers and recruiters shared patronage power and doubtless got 
other perquisites. For an idea of how Makmour could use the 
OPD to build local support among former pedjuang, see the 
report of his speech at the installation of the Langkat OPD 
on February 17th (Waspada, February 20, 1957).
65. I am indebted to Ruth McVey for suggesting Makmour1s style 
as an important factor here.
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and build on this promising base. Yet the official line was now 
that things had quieted down and it was time to recover arms 
given to civilians.66 The OPD offered an ideal formula for a 
quick change from an ad hoc action against Simbolon to a stable 
mass base, and a way to maintain the political initiative. The 
extreme rapidity of Makmour's move to establish the OPD— his 
order went out only three weeks after the events of late Decem­
ber— rand its contrast with the "official" mood of back-to-normalcy 
make it difficult not to see the OPD as a natural continuation 
of the earlier armings.67
Finally, among Makmour's reasons for setting up the OPD, 
there was one with which no one could quarrel. There had been 
some increase in the activities of gerombolan in East Sumatra 
in the preceding year, and the events of December had had an 
unsettling effect on rural areas, manifested in a serious wor­
sening of security in some places.68 The OPD was designed for 
this purpose; similar groups were being established elsewhere 
in Indonesia at this time for comparable purposes, and if Makmour 
needed arguments to persuade Gintings to ratify the setting up 
of an OPD, nothing could have served better than this.
The decision being made, the OPD was set up very rapidly 
and on a large scale. On February 6th, two and a half weeks after 
Makmour's order went out, the OPD for Kabupaten Deli-Serdang 
was formally established with about 2,000 members.69 The other 
kabupaten of the residency followed in short order on February 
17th and March 3rd: Langkat (4,219 members), Simelungun (4,235
members), Tanah Karo (about 3,000 members) and Labuhan Batu 
(2,145 members) . 70 Including the estimate for Asahan, this 
comes to a total of about 17,500 for East Sumatra, a very large 
number if one keeps in mind that it was about four or five times
6 6 . Unlike Gintings and Sugiharto, Makmour does not seem to have 
issued any orders to recover arms given to civilians or made 
any statement that the matter was closed or settled.
67. Late the following year Jusuf Adjitorop put it very concisely: 
the rakjat were armed to help oust Simbolon; later this was 
formalized as the OPD. Harian Rakjat, November 15, 1957.
6 8 . William Liddle, "Suku Simalungun; an ethnic group in search 
of representation," Indonesia, 3, (April, 1967), pp. 16f. 
says that security was disturbed in Upper Simelungun from 
Simbolon's coup until 1959 and describes an irregular armed 
group which operated there during that period.
69. Waspada, February 8 , 1957.
70. Cf., respectively, Waspada, February 10, 21; March 7, 9, 1957 . 
There is no report on the founding of the Asahan OPD; I will 
assume a membership of about 2,000 since it was probably one
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the number of regular army men in East Sumatra and Medan put to­
gether.
There is very little information about the organization, 
membership and modus operandi of the OPD. Over-all authority, 
and presumably the major decisions, rested with Makmour, work­
ing through Section V of the regimental staff. Ordinary opera­
tions appear to have been directed mainly by the PDM (Perwira 
Distrik Militer, Military District Officer) for each of the six 
kabupaten, along with perhaps a civilian coordinator.71 The 
chain proceeded downward through the parallel pamong pradja and 
army territorial hierarchies as far as the kampung level. In 
principle, OPD members would be given guns only when there was 
a security threat in their vicinity. Guns were stored, distri­
buted and otherwise controlled by the BODM (Bintara Onder- 
Distrik Militer, Military Sub-district Non-Commissioned Offi­
cers) . 72 To judge from the furor over the distribution of OPD 
weapons later in the year, however, this rule must have been 
interpreted very liberally. There is no solid information on 
what kind of people OPD members were, but we can assume a con­
siderable proportion of former pedjuang, possibly some gerombolan 
members being resettled into society, and probably large numbers 
of Sarbupri members.73 This latter question came to the fore 
in the troubles later in the year.
We can now leave the OPD as it was in the early months of 
its growth— a substantial force by any standard and an important 
source of strength for Makmour and his supporters in the military 
politics of the time.
The other major development during 1957 was the flowering 
of the East Sumatra provincial autonomy movement. The movement
of the smaller ones. There is a garbled story in PIA, Febru­
ary 15 (M), 1957, which seems to be reporting the establish­
ment of a Residency-wide OPD on February 11th. If so (an ad­
vance announcement in Waspada, February 4, 1957, shows that 
there were plans for a Dewan (Council) and staff at that 
level) there is no further word on its existence or activities
71. Waspada, February 8 and 15, 1957. The reports of this period 
mention coordinators only for the kabupaten of Simelungun and 
Tanah Karo.
72. Waspada, February 12, 15 and 20, 1957.
73. The idea that Makmour was essentially arming just Sarbupri 
members was in the air from late December, before the OPD, 
all the way through late 1957. For some bits of information 
from the early days of the OPD, see Waspada, February 12, 1957 
(where Makmour denies they are all PKI, says it varies from 
kampung to kampung) and March 13, 1957 (where unspecified 
political party representatives in Tanah Karo protest unspec­
ified political bias in OPD recruiting). One of the two named 
civilian coordinators--Kardiman in Simelungun— was a Sobsi 
official.
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rose naturally out of the strong antagonism against the Toba 
felt among Karo and Simelungun Batak and coastal Malays. It is 
worth noting, however, that it took concrete form only in Septem­
ber 1956, at a time when it was beginning to seem likely that 
Simbolon would have to leave and that he would be replaced by 
Gintings. The new organization was the Kongres Rakjat Sumatera 
Timuir, whose main public goal was the separation of the resi­
dencies of East Sumatra and Tapanuli.
There is no evidence as to what the KRST was doing between 
September and December,but it sprang into action almost immediate­
ly after the December coups, which had opened up the political 
situation and produced what promised to be a very auspicious 
change of panglimas. Like comparable movements in Riau, Djambi, 
Atjeh and elsewhere in Indonesia--secondary daerahism, one might 
call it— the KRST sought, in the first instance, not more freedom 
from Djakarta, but release from a regional tie which it found 
disadvantageous. For such movements, indeed, the central govern­
ment in Djakarta was a potential ally against the larger sukus 
or powerful military commanders in the middle. The KRST thus 
concentrated its public effort on getting a favorable ruling 
from Djakarta on its demand for a separate East Sumatra, while 
trying to maintain enough of a threat of possible direct action 
on its own behalf to be convincing as a strong local political 
force. This strategy worked well for Riau and Djambi, and worked 
so well and rapidly for Atjeh that by mid-1957 it had become a 
major exponent of primary daerahism. Thipgs were different, as 
always, in East Sumatra.
The KRST began its campaign on January 14th by sending a 
large delegation to Djakarta to press its demands. The implied 
threat behind its appeal was carried in the remarks of the leader 
of the delegation, Hadji Djaramil Damarik, to supporters who had 
come to MedanTs Polonia airport to see him off. If the delegation 
returned empty-handed from Djakarta, he said, "It will then be up 
to the representatives of the people assembled here to decide 
what steps should be taken. " 74 Undaunted by the failure of this 
delegation to get immediate results after two weeks in Djakarta, 
the KRST returned to the attack in March with a large and vocal 
four-day meeting in Medan attended by some 600 delegates. Deny­
ing that it was a "separatist" movement, or motivated by suku 
sentiments, the meeting once again demanded that East Sumatra be 
separated from Tapanuli and once again spoke darkly of possible 
steps it might be forced to take. A few days later a delegation 
of its leaders pressed its case with Sukarno, who was on a visit
74. See PIA, January 10 CM) and 15 (A), 1957 (names of delegation 
members), and January 26 (M), 1957 (names of an additional 
three leaders to represent the KRST in Djakarta). See also 
Liddle, "Suku Simalungun," p. 13 for biographical informa­
tion on Damarik.
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to Medan.7 5
In July the mood and tempo changed. One sign of this was 
that the KRST yielded the public stage to its sister organiza­
tion BAPOST (Badan Penuntut Otonomi Sumatera Timur, Organization 
for Demanding Autonomy for East Sumatra), which represented the 
same interests, and shared some of the same leadership, but 
whose name alone indicated a more militant attitude.7® On July 
3rd, one day after the government had announced a decree creating 
six new smaller provinces, the executive committee of BAPOST 
countered quickly with a statement deploring the omission of 
East Sumatra from the list. 75 67 In a plenary session held between 
July 18th and 20th, BAPOST went further. Recalling the above- 
mentioned decree, it suggested ominously that the government 
seemed to yield autonomy only to groups which used force, and 
issued an ultimatum of its own: if no success had been achieved
within a month, it would not be responsible for the results.78 
Once again, however, the government stood firm, and once again 
the threat was not carried out. On August 25th, several days 
after the ultimatum deadline had passed, BAPOST met again and 
announced that it had decided to seek autonomy by legal parlia­
mentary ways. 79
75. PIA, March 13 (A), 19 (A) and 20 (A), 1957. The latter lists
the officers of the KRST: I. Kerani Bukit (Chairman), Kosen
Tjokrosentoso (Vice-Chairman) and Mbulgah Sitepu (Secretary- 
General) .
76. There is no information on when BAPOST was formed. The
earliest mention of it in the press that I have seen is in 
PIA, January 7 (M), 1957 (where it is called PAPOST, i.e., 
Panitya . . .). BAPOST1s Secretary-General was Mbulgah Sitepu,
who held the same office in the KRST. For a description of 
the important role played by BAPOST in Simelungun politics
in 1957 and after see, Liddle, "Suku Simalungun,tT pp. 17-18.
77. PIA, July 3 (M), 1957. The six new provinces were West 
Sumatra, Riau and Djambi, along with three in East Indonesia.
78. PIA, July 24 (M), 1957. The story adds that KRST had not yet 
commented on the ultimatum, but that it tended to emphasize 
the legal approach. This is the last mention I have seen of 
the KRST. I will use the name BAPOST below to cover the 
whole movement, including the KRST.
79. PIA, August 27 (A), 1957. The failure of these and later 
threats to get results must be attributed ultimately to the 
very factor which BAPOST cited in its ultimatum. Djakarta 
in this period did indeed yield on many points to daerahs 
which could pose credible threats. The problem was precisely 
that East Sumatra was too divided to be able to do so.
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Needless to say* all this agitation stimulated a response 
within East Sumatra. The great increase in the activity of the 
autonomy movement which followed the December coups was accom­
panied by an equally vigorous campaign of opposition led by a 
newly created Gerakan Anti-Separatis, in which the PKI and its 
associated organizations were particularly active.80 As its very 
name promised* GAS attacked the demand for autonomy mainly as a 
violation of the ideal of national unity. A more interesting 
subsidiary argument, peculiarly forceful in the light of East 
Sumatran history, was that BAPOST was organized by leaders of 
the old federal Negara Sumatera Timur* Dutch puppets who wanted 
East Sumatran autonomy in order to bring back the old days, when 
the local sultans collaborated with the plantation syndicates to 
oppress the people. The day had of course passed for any restora­
tion of Dutch rule* but the charge had something to it, for the 
social elements which had backed or acquiesced in the old NST 
did tend to support the autonomy movement. It was a shrewd thrust, 
stirring up memories of Van Mook and Dr. Mansur, and BAPOST paid 
testimony to its force by denying the charge frequently and 
vehemently.81
Outside East Sumatra, the autonomy movement also roused a 
strong reaction among non- and anti-Communist Toba Batak.
Tapanuli, in this period, produced a Badan Pendukung Keutuhan 
Sumatera Utara (Body to Support the Integrity of North Sumatra), 
and this organization agitated vigorously along with already 
existing Toba and other Tapanuli Batak groupings. Understand­
ably, however, they based their case not on anti-separatism but 
on the argument that the autonomy movement was based on narrow 
motives of suku jealousy and reprisal. And certainly they were 
correct in their charge, for it was the whole point of the 
autonomy movement to reduce Toba predominance in East Sumatra 
by cutting them off politically from their base in Tapanuli. 82
So far I have described the autonomy question in its "politi­
cal" aspect. But since Simbolonfs coup all politics in East 
Sumatra had become military politics. Thus at the time of the
80. There is very little information on the early history, leader­
ship and structure of GAS. For examples of early anti­
autonomy statements by North Sumatran branches of PKI 
auxiliaries, see, PIA, January 25 (A), 1957, (BTI-SU) and 
February 1 (A), 1957 (SOBSI-SU).
81. PIA, January 24 (M) (speech by L. Darman, PKI), March 13 (A) 
(Marzuki Lubis, PNI) and July 31 (A), 1957 (Amat Sjafei,
PKI) .
82. It was equally true, of course, that the desire of Toba and 
other Tapanuli Batak to preserve the existing province was 
based on their own ethnic interest. For some information on 
these movements, see PIA, January 17 (A), January 29 (A)
and September 8 (A), 1957.
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big March meeting of the KRST there were rumors that the TT-I 
command was planning a coup if the demand for provincial 
autonomy were not met. There was probably nothing to these 
rumors— Gintings, even if he had wanted to, was hardly strong 
enough at the time to contemplate something of this kind--but 
they suggest the way men were thinking. 83 Gintings, in any 
case, did take the case for autonomy to the Musjawarah Nasional 
in September and succeeded in extracting a qualified recommenda­
tion implying a separation of East Sumatra and Tapanuli. 84 From 
this and later evidence, it is clear that Gintings was giving 
support to the autonomy movement, though he did not commit him­
self fully to it and seems never to have endorsed it publicly. 
Makmour took the GAS side and, in this way, another general 
political issue was caught up in the factional struggle and 
helped to exacerbate it, with consequences which we shall see 
in a moment.
One further point needs to be made before we turn to the 
final crisis in the cycle of events with which this paper is 
concerned. I have been talking here, and will be later, only 
about the demand for autonomy itself, a specific issue openly 
disputed. But the public issue was only the visible part of 
a larger social issue: what the place of the Toba was now to
be under the new dispensation and in a rapidly changing situa­
tion. Government positions were also at issue here, and licenses 
and contracts and access to schools. It would be quite unrea­
sonable to suppose that those active in BAPOST, BPKSU or GAS 
were interested solely or even primarily in the political geometry 
of North Sumatra, yet that is virtually all that surfaces in 
the published sources. In 1957, to give a specific example, 
Gintings issued a new regulation that school admissions should 
be handled by a committee of three--the headmaster, a parents’ 
representative and a local official--instead of by the head­
master alone as before. This measure, of course, reduced the 
power of the headmasters, a large majority of whom were Toba, 
and its cumulative effect on East Sumatran society was potential­
ly very large indeed. Most supporters of BAPOST would have been 
very pleased with this and some must have worked for it; yet I 
have found no mention of it in the press, though there is plenty 
on the autonomy movement itself. 85
83. PIA, March 15 (A), 1957. There were similar rumors in 
October.
84. PIA, September 15 (M), 1957. On a Kementerian Dalam Negeri 
(interior Ministry) delegation visiting North Sumatra to in­
vestigate the question after the Musjawarah Nasional, see 
PIA, September 21 (M), October 3 (A) and 9 (A), 1957; also 
Waspada, September 29, 1957 (BAPOST greeting the delegation 
with flowers). Nothing came of this possibility for provin­
cial autonomy either.
85. The information is from Herbert Feith.
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Below the clamor of the surface events we have been survey­
ing— military detachments with tractors rooting out squattersT 
plots, loud cries for provincial autonomy and against separatism, 
military conferences about the control of the 0PD--great tides 
had been moving in East Sumatran society. At the same time, 
within the army in East Sumatra, influenced by and influencing 
its environment, a practically silent struggle for power had 
been going on. Once can sense the conditions of this struggle 
dimly in certain specifically military matters, such as the tram­
mels on Gintings! exercise of office, and a bit less dimly in areas 
where the factional struggle was superimposed on public issues, as 
with Makmourf s building up of the OPD and Gintings’ partial but 
still evident association with the interests behind BAPOST. But 
it is only really from late July, with the reappearance of open 
incidents involving military force, that the picture becomes 
clearer again, and we are able to see some of the results of over 
half a year of maneuver.
It is clear from the tone of press reports, from evidence 
that Nasution was paying increasing attention to East Sumatra 
and even, ironically, from the fact that in mid-July both 
Gintings and Makmour declared that the army in East Sumatra 
was free of politics and should remain so,86 that things were 
beginning to come to a head. The first we hear of direct military 
action is BAPOST1s cry of triumph on July 25th, announcing that a 
number of opponents of the autonomy movement had been arrested 
for distributing forged letters--evidently real forgeries, to 
judge from examples published later in the press— purported to 
come from various members of BAPOST, from Major Munthe and the 
Sultan of Deli, and from various Dutch interests which were 
writing big checks to finance BAPOST. One alleged letter offered 
a large bribe if Gintings would promise to get rid of Makmour 
and eliminate the OPD— a revealing indication of how the OPD 
and autonomy issues were tied up together in men’s minds with the 
rivalry between Gintings and Makmour. The names of those 
arrested were never revealed, though a spokesman for TT-I did 
say at one point that they included military men as well as 
civilians. Nor was it stated who did the arresting; it is 
evident, however, that it was Gintings’ side, most likely 
Gintings himself.87
8 6 • PIA, July 17 (A) and 19(A), 1957. They were responding to a 
dictum to this effect by Nasution. Not long after, at the 
end of a significantly long (two week) tour of North Sumatra, 
Nasution again cautioned civilian and military officials in 
East Sumatra not to involve themselves in the autonomy issue, 
a clear sign that they were doing so. See PIA, July 31 (M), 
1957 .
87. On the letters and the arrests see Waspada, August 3, 6 , 7,
10 and 17 , 1957 ; PIA, July 25 (A) and 2 7 (A) , August 2 (A),
7 (M) and 12 (M), 1957.
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Six weeks later, in early September, Makmour responded in 
kind, arresting the mayor and a number of other prominent people 
in Tebing Tinggi, some or all of whom were BAPOST supporters. 8 
Makmour!s part in this, though not discussed in the press reports, 
seems straightforward enough. What is interesting is GintingsT 
role. On September 5th, he mentioned the arrests in the course 
of a press conference in a way that suggested that he approved 
of them. On the 23rd, his press officer marked time with a 
lengthy and evasive statement. On the 25th, the same press 
officer was suddenly crisp and clear: the arrests were the
responsibility of the Second Regiment, not TT-I, and the people 
had now all been freed.8 9
There was another sign in these same days that showed even 
more convincingly that the two months of fencing between Gintings 
and Makmour was coming rapidly to an end. On September 23rd, it 
was announced that Major A. Manaf Lubis would replace Captain 
R. T. Ginting as Chief of Staff of the Second Regiment and that 
Major R. Sjahnan would replace Captain H. R. Asmadi as commander 
of Battalion 133.90 Ginting and Asmadi were both strong supporters 
of Makmour and their removal, on Nasutionfs orders, at a time of 
acute tension between Gintings and Makmour, showed that the tide 
was beginning to run against the latter.
Gintings1 next move brought an abrupt end to the fencing and 
precipitated a month-long tumult in the army in East Sumatra. On 
September 28th, he arrested Makmour together with two of his lead­
ing supporters in the Second Regiment, Ginting and Lieutenant 
Gindo Bangko, and at the same time launched a drive to disarm mem­
bers of the OPD and bring it to order (tertibkan). We cannot be 
certain how he had managed to improve his position enough to be 
able to carry off such a bold and open coup, but the evidence sug­
gests that during his stay in Djakarta for the Musjawarah Nasional 
he had persuaded Nasution to give him strong backing. It was
8 8 . Waspada, September 13 (report of raids and arrests), September 
19 (names of seven people arrested), and September 30, 1957 
(BAPOST statement mentioning them as its supporters).
89. Waspada, September 6 , 24 and 26, 1957. A week earlier Slamet 
Gintings, a PNI member of the DPR and the most influential 
Karo politician, sharply criticized the arrests and blamed 
them on Makmour and the PKI. See PIA, September 22 (M), 1957 .
90. Waspada, September 24, 1957. Ginting has been mentioned 
earlier. Asmadi signed the December 24th Siantar officers1 
resolution and he led the unit from Battalion 133 which cap­
tured the Medan radio station on December 27th. Battalion 133 
had its headquarters in Tebingtinggi, and presumably, therefore, 
made the controversial arrests there earlier in the
month.
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Nasution, not Gintings, who had transferred Ginting and Asmadi 
on September 23rd. Gintings returned to Medan from Djakarta 
on September 24th. The TT-I press officerTs much sharper com­
ments on Makmourfs Tebingtinggi arrests had appeared on September 
25th, and MakmourTs arrest three days after that. On September 
30th, Nasution sent his Second Deputy, Colonel Ibnu Sutowo, to 
Medan for lengthy talks with Gintings. When Ibnu Sutowo flew 
back to Djakarta on October 2nd,he took Makmour with him; while 
on the same day Gintings announced that Manaf Lubis had replaced 
Makmour as commander of the Second Regiment. On October 5th, 
Nasution ordered Ginting and Bangko to Djakarta and on the 8th 
it was announced that all three had been relieved of their posts 
on NasutionTs orders, and had been assigned to duty in Djakarta. 
Two months later Makmour was sent off to military school in 
India. Gintings could hardly have asked for firmer support from 
his superior than this.91
He also got strong support from Nasution on the wider and 
much more delicate question of disarming and reorganizing the 
OPD. Nasution issued an order to all members of the OPD to turn 
in their weapons no later than October 5th, and Gintings, sup­
ported now by Manaf Lubis, immediately set about putting it into 
effect.92 In four of the six kabupaten in East Sumatra the OPD 
units obeyed the order and there was either little difficulty 
or none at all. In Langkat they were balky, but not openly 
aggressive. But in Simelungun they felt forced to act.93 94 On 
October 4th, there was a minor clash; before dawn on the 7th, 
several hundred OPD members launched a sudden attack on Pematang 
Siantar and in a few hours of wild firing produced almost the 
only bloodshed of the whole year of regional crises in Indonesia: 
half a dozen civilians and two policemen were killed by random 
shots. 9 *
The attack was beaten off and fifty OPD members were captured 
along with a lot of weapons. But there were still at least 4,000
91. On the whole affair, see: Waspada, September 30, October 1-4,
5 (Asmadi sent to SSKAD), 8 , 9 and 16, December 24 and 26 
(Makmour to India), 1957; Harian Rakjat, October 4 and 14,
1957; PIA, October 2 (M), 4 (M), 7 (A), 9 (M), 10 (A) and
14 (A), 1957.
92. Nasution!s order is given in PIA, October 11 (M), 1957 (it is
not stated when it was actually issued). It was first publicly
announced by Gintings on October 2nd (Waspada, October 4,
1957). Manaf Lubis made a similar announcement on October
3rd (Waspada, October 12, 1957).
93. For this breakdown of the kabupaten see the October 7th state­
ment by the press officer of TT-I given in Waspada, October
8 , 1957.
94. W^^pada 5 October 8 , 9, 12 and 14 , 1957 ; PIA, October 9 (M) and
10 (M) , 1957. Some sources place the event on October 6th,
but the 7th seems to be correct.
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OPD people left in Simelungun plus about 6,000 in Langkat and 
resistance to handing in their weapons and being TTbrought to 
order11 did not burn itself out with the Pematang Siantar raid.95 
Nasution continued his strong support to Gintings in handling 
this problem. On October 9th he was reported by the press 
officer of TT-I as has having issued strict orders for OPD 
disturbances to be suppressed.96 In the four or five weeks that 
followed,he devoted a great deal of attention to the matter. In 
fact, it is probably more accurate to say that he took it over 
entirely from Gintings.
‘The matter required some attention. Middle and late October 
saw a patchwork of arrests, minor clashes, exhortations and 
threats by the army and a number of surrenders. But there were 
still many weapons outstanding and many OPD members unrepentant 
in Simelungun at the end of the month. 7 98 In Langkat the course 
of development was much more decorous and the subjection of the 
OPD advanced somewhat more rapidly, though even here it was far 
from over by the end of October.96 Even in Deli-Serdang, one 
of the four kabupaten announced as all cleared up on October 8th, 
there was an incident on October 11th followed by a series of 
arrests and other measures, and the tone of the news reports 
makes it clear that the atmosphere continued to be tense.99
On October 31st, however, Nasution issued a new and more 
vigorous ultimatum, giving a ten-day deadline, and threatening
95. The figure of 6,000 for Langkat is given in Waspada, November 
7, 1957. It represents a considerable increase from the 
figure of 4,219 reported in March. Evidently the OPD was 
growing beyond its original large size. I have no further 
information on this obviously significant development.
96. PIA, October 10 (M), 1957. Waspada, October 22, 1957, mentions 
a Nasution order (date not indicated) to the OPD members in­
volved in the Siantar raid to surrender.
97. Armed incidents are reported in Waspada, October 12, 14 and 
16 (two), 1957; and PIA, October 31 (M), 1957. Surrenders 
are reported in Waspada, October 14 (40 OPD members) and 22, 
1957 (surrender of half a ton of hidden bullets and other 
munitions).
98. Waspada, October 12, 1957 (the press officer of TT-I says that 
Langkat is now being !lbrought to order”) ; PIA, October 13 (M) , 
1957 (the press officer of TT-I denies that army-OPD tensions 
are building up in Pangkalan Brandan as in Siantar before 
October 7th); and Waspada, October 15 and 24, 1957 (in response 
to reports that the Langkat OPD is reluctant to follow orders 
from Gintings a spokesman for Nasution declares that an order 
from Gintings is an order from Nasution and must be obeyed).
99. Waspada, October 5, 16, 18 and 28, November 1, 1957.
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serious military operations if the arms were not handed in by 
that time.100 Perhaps it was this ultimatum which did the trick, 
or perhaps it was some understanding reached by negotiations-- 
Nasution met with the civilian coordinators of the Simelungun 
and Langkat OPD on October 28th, and met again with the Simelungun 
coordinator, Kardiman, on November 8th, just before the deadline 
expired.101 At any rate, the ultimatum was followed by rapid 
changes. In a ceremony at Bindjai on November 6th, 301 members 
of the Langkat OPD reported back for duty under army control, 
turning in 161 weapons.102 On November 10th, there was a much 
larger ceremony of the same sort at Siantar for 1,584 members 
of the Simelungun OPD at which Manaf Lubis and Kardiman spoke.103 104
In his speech Manaf Lubis announced that 90% of the weapons 
signed out to OPD members in East Sumatra had been turned in.10if 
Though the year ended with some arms still outstanding, the pos­
sibility that the OPD would entrench itself in East Sumatra under 
a leadership hostile to Nasution or Gintings had faded.105
100. Waspada, October 31 and November 5, 1957. The latter re­
ports that on October 31st 10,000 leaflets with Nasution1s 
letter to the OPD were dropped by plane, mostly on Simelungun 
and Langkat. No source offers the text of Nasution*s letter.
101. Waspada, October 31 and November S, 1957. On November 9th, 
Subandi, OPD coordinator of Ketjamatan Panei at Panei Tongah 
in Simelungun, talked with Gintings. Gintings agreed to 
release five imprisoned OPD members per day--presumably as 
part of a deal to facilitate the surrender of OPD members who 
had still not turned in their weapons (Harian Rakjat, November 
22, 1957).
102. Waspada, November 7, 1957. The arms included three bren guns, 
and one mortar. There were very amiable speeches by the 
civilian coordinator for Langkat (Totong Harahap) and the 
commander of Battalion 139 (Captain Maliki). The latter*s 
speech sounds as if he did not approve of the penertiban,
as might be expected of a stout Makmour supporter that he 
was. See further below on both of these speeches.
103. Waspada, November 11, 1957, has a fine description of this 
occasion, giving the impression that for the individual OPD 
member present it was less a political event than a holiday. 
See also Waspada, November 14, 1957, and PIA, November 12 (M), 
1957 .
104. The same day, a spokesman for Nasution gave the following
breakdown: 60% of registered weapons had been returned in
Simelungun, 90% in Langkat, and 100% in the other four 
kabupaten (Harian Rakjat, November 11 , 1957 ).
105. Waspada, November 16, (Manaf Lubis urges the rest of the OPD 
in Simelungun Atas to come in); November 29 (the press officer 
of TT-I states that only a few Simelungun OPD members have
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What was this large, long-drawn-out and intricate episode 
about? One thing which is implicit in what I have already said 
about the disarming and reorganization of the OPD is that it 
was closely tied up with the factional struggle among the East 
Sumatra military. Bringing the OPD back under control was an 
integral part of Gintings' attack on Makmour. The OPD raid on 
Pematang Siantar followed within a week of Makmourfs fall in a 
situation suddenly opened up again by that drastic event. Other 
information suggests an even more direct connection. One of the 
first things done by TT-I after the raid was to place First 
Lieutenant Tarumon, the officer coordinating the OPD, under 
detention.106 In the same period, the press officer of TT-I 
pointedly called attention to the fact that the arms used by 
the OPD members in the raid had been distributed by Makmour; 
at a press conference Gintings refused to say whether any army 
officers had been involved in the incident but hinted that it 
was connected with the earlier arrests of Makmour and the others; 
and Nasution a few days later gave the same hint.107 These 
particles of information suggest the possibility that one or 
more pro-Makmour officers had a hand in the Siantar raid, just 
as Captain Maliki's above-mentioned remarks at the Bindjai 
ceremony on November 6th suggest that other pro-Makmour officers 
who remained in good standing disapproved of the disarming of 
the OPD. At any rate, it is clear that one cannot understand 
this episode without taking account of parallel developments 
in the military factional struggle.
A second way of looking at the OPD episode is in terms of 
PKI involvement in the OPD. On October 12th, the Medan news­
paper Tjerdas struck a note very common in the anti-PKI press 
when it headlined a story on the Siantar raid "PKI Gagal dengan 
Madiun Affairnja ke-II" (PKI Fails with its Second Madiun 
Affair) . 108 During this same period, the North Sumatra PNI turned 
sharply against the PKI. On October 22nd, the party declared 
that the recent disorders had been engineered by the PKI through 
the OPD, and,on November 11th, Slamet Gintings reiterated the
not reported back. The picture he gives suggests that the 
holdouts have in effect become a gerombolan); and December 
23, 1957 (Manaf Lubis says that 99% of the Simelungun OPD 
have now reported back).
106. PIA, October 9 (M), 1957, and Waspada, October 12, 1957. 
The sources do not say whether his 3 0b covered just 
Simelungun or all of East Sumatra. There is no other 
information on him.
107. See, respectively, PIA, October 11 (M), 1957; Waspada, 
October 9, 1957 and also PIA, October 9 (M), 1957; and 
Waspada, October 17, 1957.
108. Quoted in Harian Rakjat, October 17, 1957. The Tjerdas 
story goes on to link the name of a Simelungun PKI leader 
with the raid.
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point in the DPR, adding the assertion that Makmour had collabor­
ated closely with Kardiman in developing the OPD as a political 
tool.109 These charges rested on certain undeniable facts.
There were certainly substantial numbers of Sarbupri members in 
the OPD, and PKI, SOBSI, and especially Sarbupri leaders, played 
important roles as OPD coordinators and the like. Apart from 
Kardiman, the press in this period reported numerous examples 
of PKI office-holders in the OPD disappearing for a time and 
under investigation for complicity in OPD resistance.110 The 
PKI itself testified to the accuracy of some of these factual 
statements and to the embarrassing position it found itself in? 
by taking a very defensive line throughout this period. Its 
basic defence was that if it were true that there were many PKI 
members in the OPD, this only showed that they were in the fore­
front of the struggle to preserve the unity of the Republic and 
prevent the restoration of the old NST— an argument which in 
effect admitted the existence of many PKI OPD members and tried 
to justify it.111 In this defensive vein, the PKI and its 
associated organizations in Djakarta and Medan repeatedly en­
joined their members during this period to be careful what they 
did, to resist provocation and to cooperate closely with the 
military, for example by turning in their weapons, if they hap­
pened to be OPD members.112
A full analysis of PKI policy and motives in this case 
would take us into questions of national-level politics beyond 
the bounds of this paper. For our purposes, it is sufficient 
to note that the undoubted importance of Sarbupri and other PKI 
members in the OPD does not necessarily indicate that the local 
or national level PKI really viewed the OPD as a means of taking 
power in East Sumatra. It looks far more as if PKI activity in 
the OPD was an effort to gain limited advantages from the chang­
ing local situation. Nor does the common involvement of Makmour 
and PKI groups in the OPD require that they have had common pur­
poses in so doing; all we can be certain of is that they saw some 
profit in tactical cooperation. Finally, the participation of 
some PKI members in the Siantar raid and the intransigence of the 
OPD generally does not necessarily mean that this was part of
109. See, respectively, PIA, November 5 (A) and 12 (M), 1957.
1 1 0 . See the examples given in Waspada, October 7, 15, 26, 28 
and November 1 , 1957; also PIA, October 21 (M), 1957, for 
information on Djintan Purba?who was a leader of Sarbupri, 
OPD and GAS in Simelungun.
111. See Harian Rakjat, October 19, 1957, for a typical rendering 
of this argument.
112. Examples of such instructions occur in Harian Rakjat, 
October 10, 17 and 18, 1957.
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central PKI policy at all. Quite the contrary, the general atti­
tude of the Djakarta leadership, reflected in the pages of Harian 
Rakjat in this period, suggests apprehension and even some per­
plexity about what the local membership up there in East Sumatra 
might be doing. We cannot forget that PKI members in East Sumatra 
had their own and East Sumatran, as well as PKI, reasons for their 
actions, and that the former may have been decisive in*this 
affair.
This leads to a third and final point. In reading through 
the record of the army handling of the OPD episode in October 
and November one is struck by how careful and conciliatory it 
was, despite fairly substantial arrests and threats of large 
military operations. Deadlines were repeatedly extended, negotia­
tions were constantly held and there was practically no patrolling 
or shooting against what were, after all, technically insurgent 
groups. The army, moreover, showed a judicious regard throughout 
for the interests of OPD members. Its statements laid heavy 
emphasis on the fact that the OPD was not going to be abolished, 
but simply reorganized, and its possession of weapons put on a 
stricter basis. 13 One passing reference indicates that the 
army was paying a bounty ("honorarium”) to OPD members coming 
back into the fold.111* The atmosphere of conciliation is sug­
gested in the remarks of the civilian coordinator for Langkat at 
a ceremony on November 6th, celebrating the return of the 301 
OPD members to the fold. He said that he hoped the security of 
OPD members would be properly guaranteed, and went on to make 
various suggestions or demands--hardly the tone of a humble 
rebel grateful for an amnesty.
This could be put down to cultural characteristics, and 
explained as a very "Indonesian" way of handling a situation of 
this kind. But another more interesting possibility exists: 
the army treated the OPD with great delicacy in October and 
November because by that time the OPD had become something of a 
social movement with a life of its own, apart from the original 
intentions of its creators and managers, Makmour and some of his 
officers, some local PKI leaders, and perhaps some pamongpradja.
It is hard to characterize the sources of this social movement 
because the newspaper material naturally concentrates on the 
actions and motives of its managers, but one can make a few 
suggestions. The strong emphasis in army field information 
materials on the fact that the OPD was not to be disbanded, only 
reorganized, suggests that membership was valued for itself re­
gardless of who was managing the organization and for what purposes.
113. Examples of this appear very early on, in Waspada, October 
5, and also 8 , 16 and November 16, 1957.
11H. Waspada, October 15, 1957. This payment, in Langkat, was 
said to be in accordance with Nasution's orders, thus, 
presumably, general policy.
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Membership brought with it some tangible, but chiefly, I would 
guess, intangible benefits: recognition for pedjuang, hope of
some kind of social mobility for younger men, and some increased 
security, status and prestige for all. These were threatened 
by the sudden order to turn in oneT s weapons, and this perceived 
threat produced the Siantar raid— which looks so futile and irra­
tional when seen from above--and the intransigence of the follow­
ing weeks.
This way of looking at the OPD episode implies, of course, 
that there is yet another vantage point from which to observe 
the events covered by this paper. There are not only the Djakarta 
and Medan points of view, but also what one might call the rural 
East Sumatra perspective. The parallel is not exact because the 
shift from Medan to rural East Sumatra involves not only a change 
of geographical location and level of organization (as in the 
shift from Djakarta to Medan), but also a descent from elite into 
folk history. But the same point can be made and a more exact 
parallel can be found if one asks why it was that the OPD episode 
took so different a course in Simelungun and Langkat from the 
course it followed in the other four kabupaten. Clearly, for 
one thing, a special situation prevailed in Simelungun. Clearly, 
too, for the historian of Simelungun, Medan is just as much a 
center, with its own broader but shallower perspective, as 
Djakarta is for Medan.115 There is a hierarchy of historical 
perspectives here; in this paper I am taking only one of several 
possible steps downward when I move my vantage point from 
Djakarta to Medan.
One might have supposed, sitting in Medan in early October 
1957 and seeing Gintings1 apparently effortless expulsion of 
Makmour and the brisk beginning of the drive to disarm the OPD, 
that Gintings had come out on top. Within a few weeks, however, 
he was tottering on the brink of a fall. The storm actually 
broke on October 19th, but two earlier incidents foretold its 
coming.
The first was the Siantar OPD raid on October 7th, an 
unusual and disturbing challenge to established authority, 
especially Gintings1, and a sign of unmanageable forces at work 
just below the surface. The other was a curious incident on 
October 8th, in which troops of Sector FF directly confronted 
Gintings. These troops, originating from East Sumatra, had been 
sent to Atjeh four years earlier at the beginning of Daud 
Beureuehfs insurrection and had been stationed in the kabupaten 
of East Atjeh, which for operational purposes was labelled 
Sector FF. When Sjamaun Gaharu established his autonomous KDM 
Atjeh in January 1957 and set about getting the army in Atjeh
115. This comes out clearly in LiddleTs "Suku Simalungun."
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back into Atjehnese hands, there was inevitable friction with 
Sector FF.116 In late January 1957, Captain Jusuf, the commander 
of Sector FF, declared it independent of KDM Atjeh and now dir­
ectly under the panglima of TT-I. Gaharu, who had just uni­
laterally freed himself from TT-I, blandly contended that Jusuf*s 
unilateral declaration was intolerable and took his case to 
Djakarta. By August, he had partly won. On the 20th, the East 
Atjeh sector was incorporated into KDM Atjeh, and in early 
September, Jusuf and his troops, a battalion strong, were returned 
to East Sumatra.
The troops were stationed temporarily in Medan, assigned to 
the KMKB, while the military authorities tried to decide what to 
do with them. The barracks were inadequate, there were rumors 
that the unit was to be disbanded, Jusuf disappeared, and it 
was rumored that he had been arrested. All this was too much 
for the men; on October 8th two companies of Sector FF troops, 
fully armed, came to TT-I headquarters to protest. Gintings 
managed to calm them with promises and they went away, but re­
mained resentful. On the other hand, what was actually a 
flagrant breach of discipline remained unpunished.117
Eleven days later Medan witnessed still another coup, sub­
sequently known as the October 19th Affair. It began at 8:30 
on the morning of the 19th, when Sector FF troops surrounded 
the TT-I headquarters in Medan. They were soon joined by tanks 
from the divisional cavalry squadron and the divisional CPM 
(military police) battalion, both commanded by Javanese.118 
Two hours later, three officers of Gintings* faction— Majors 
Nelang Sembiring (Deputy Chief of Staff), Zein Hamid (Head of 
Staff Section I) and Lahiradja Munthe (Head of Staff Section 
IV)— were escorted out of the headquarters by Major Sukardi, 
the commander of the CPM battalion, were taken to the airport 
and flown out to Djakarta.
116. This friction was exacerbated by the fact that much of 
the population of East Atjeh was ethnically non-Atjehnese 
and thus presumably looked on the Sector FF troops as 
some insurance against Gaharu*s increasingly successful 
Atjehnese movement. Newspaper reports, however, carry 
only faint hints of this kind of sentiment.
117. The main sources on Sector FF are Waspada, January 29, 
August 20 and 23, September 11 and October 9, 1957.
118. Waspada, November 9, 1957. Since July, the commander of
the divisional cavalry squadron was Captain R. A. Muljono. 
According to an informant who participated in these events, 
there were two other units involved in the action against 
Gintings along with the ones mentioned above: the divi­
sional artillery unit and Battalion 131, commanded by 
Major Henry Siregar.
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Meanwhile, two announcements were broadcast over the Medan 
radio, at 9:15 and 10:30 a.m., by spokesmen claiming to repre­
sent the NCO's and enlisted men of TT-I. These statements con­
demned Gintings for causing tension in the area by his arrest 
of Makmour, Ginting and Bangko, and declared that, to avoid a 
vacuum of authority, Sugiharto had been chosen to command TT-I.
At 11:00, there was an announcement from division headquarters 
saying that command was now held by Sugiharto.
The action of the coup was not confined to the TT-I head­
quarters building. Tanks and military pickets, reported to be 
from KMKB Medan, were placed throughout the city at strategic 
places. A heavy guard was also placed about Gintings1 house, 
but he managed to escape and went to an unrevealed hiding place 
outside Medan, possibly Brastagi. When Prime Minister Djuanda 
arrived at the airport later in the day, on a previously scheduled 
visit to discuss the question of a separate East Sumatra province, 
Gintings was not there to greet him. Sugiharto was.119 120
Such was the course of the coup. All the rest, up to the 
final settlement in mid-December, was negotiation, and decisions 
by the Army Chief of Staff. Nasution wasted no time flying up 
to Medan early on October 20th. Over the next few days, he 
stabilized the situation by a series of quick moves. In a radio 
broadcast that same evening, he declared that it was intolerable 
for a panglima to be ousted by his subordinates by armed force, 
and made it clear that Gintings was still panglima. The next 
day he brought Lieutenant-Colonel Hasan Kasim back from TT-II in 
Palembang to serve once again as Acting Chief of Staff of TT-I.
On the 22nd, he announced that Sembiring, Hamid and Munthe would 
remain in Djakarta; Sembiring would be replaced by Major Boyke 
Nainggolan and the other two by their deputies.129 On the 23rd, 
a unit from the RPKAD (Army Paratroop Regiment) arrived in Medan, 
technically assigned to Gintings as panglima.121 On the same
119. The main narrative account of the coup and the weeks follow­
ing is DjuandaTs statement to the DPR on November 8th (text 
in PIA, November 8 (A) and 9 (A), 1957). See also Waspada, 
October 22 and 23, November 9, 1957; PIA, October 21 (M, A), 
22 (M), 1957; and Harian Rakjat, October 22, 1957. One re­
port says that Sugiharto handed Djuanda a letter at the air­
port, after which Djuanda was quoted as saying that 
Sugiharto had reported a serious new development in the 
area (PIA, October 21 (M), 1957).
120. Waspada, October 23, 1957. The two deputies are not named 
m  this report. HamidTs replacement was either Captain 
Langlang Buwana (PIA, October 23 (M), 1957) or Captain 
Sinulingga (Djuanda, in the DPR, November 8 ) or conceivably 
these two in succession. Djuanda has Captain Muluk Lubis 
replacing Munthe.
121. Waspada, October 23, 1957. This decision was announced by 
Nasution on October 22nd, but circumstances delayed their
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day, Nasution, in another radio broadcast, declared that the 
first stage of settling the problem had been completed and that 
the second stage would come soon; he also ordered all troops 
confined to barracks for the time being and forbade army men 
to arm civilians, or to disarm, shoot at or arrest one another.122 
On the 24th, Gintings returned to Medan, past sealed off roads, 
through empty streets heavily guarded by RPKAD troops, and 
appeared in the guise of panglima at a formal gathering in the 
Governors office, presided over by Nasution.123 124 This final 
ceremony accomplished, Nasution flew off to Djakarta, promising 
to return soon, and leaving Ibnu Sutowo behind to represent 
him.1 2 *
There is no need to go deeply into what Nasution called 
the second stage of his solution to the crisis. The problem, 
from his point of view, was to find a combination of officers 
for the leading positions in TT-I--especially the four offices 
vacated during the coup--who would run TT-I under his overall 
direction and not be at each others’ throats the moment he left 
town. The method he employed to resolve the crisis was a long- 
drawn-out series of conferences and private talks, almost round- 
the-clock between October 28th and November 8th, when Djuanda 
made his DPR statement on the Affair, and fairly frequently in 
the weeks that followed.125 The result, revealed in a series
arrival until the next day.
122. Waspada, October 24, 1957; PIA, October 24 (M), 1957. The 
troops were apparently kept confined to barracks until the 
end of October (see Nasution1s press conference on November 
1st, reported in Harian Rakjat, November 2 , 1957). On the 
24th, a spokesman for Nasution had no comment on reports 
that civilians had been armed during the October 19th
coup (PIA, October 25 (M), 1957). There are no other re­
ports on the arming of civilians; thus, although there was 
presumably some distribution of weapons, it was evidently not 
very extensive and was quickly stopped.
123. Waspada, October 25, 1957. He left Medan again the next 
day and stayed away thereafter (Harian Rakjat, October 29 
and 31, 1957). Soon we find a spokesman for Nasution say­
ing that Gintings was on leave outside Medan in order to 
relax after going through the recent tensions (PIA, October 
30 (M), 1957).
124. Waspada, October 25, 1957. Other stories on the first 
stage of the settlement, not cited so far, are in Waspada, 
October 21, 22, 26 and 30, 1957.
125. Nasution himself was in East Sumatra between October 28th and 
November I'st, on November 6th and 7th, a day or two around 
November 16th, and finally between December 17th and 19th. 
Relays of high-ranking Army Headquarters officers succeeded 
Ibnu Sutowo in his guardian role at TT-I headquarters at
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of formal transfers of office on December 18th and 19th, differed 
little from the constellation sketched in on October 23rd and 
24th. Nothing was said about Gintings and Sugiharto, who re­
mained in their old jobs. Hasan Kasim remained as divisional 
Chief of Staff. Boyke Nainggolan was sworn in as Deputy Chief 
of Staff and also as head of Staff Section I, thus replacing 
both Nelang Sembiring and Zein Hamid, who were inducted into 
lesser jobs in TT-I. Muluk Lubis was sworn in as head of Staff 
Section IV, replacing Lahiradja Munthe, who remained in Djakarta, 
assigned to Army Headquarters. Manaf Lubis was inaugurated as 
Commander of the Second Regiment as well as its Chief of Staff 
(his original position on September 25th). Wahab Makmour, as 
mentioned above, went to military school in India a few days 
later; nothing was said about the fate of R. T. Ginting.126
So much for the main course of events. We can now turn to 
the how and why of the October 19th Affair. In the conditions 
which prevailed during the first half of the 1950fs, it was pos­
sible for Simbolon to maintain hegemony over the large, old TT-I. 
But, during 1956, the basis of that hegemony was undermined, and 
the coups of late December 1956 destroyed it overnight. TT-I 
then broke up into separate fragments: KDM Sumatera Tengah,
KDM Atjeh, a largely autonomous Third Regiment, and even Sector 
FF, for a moment. In these cases, the break-up of the old unit 
was along natural geographic or suku lines of cleavage. Inside 
East Sumatra the social situation was more complex, and any 
simple fragmentation was impossible. What developed instead-- 
and developed very rapidly in response to the same conditions 
which produced the KDM Atjeh and the other autonomous fragments-- 
was a set of military factions: Gintings1, MakmourTs and
Sugiharto1s, with SimbolonTs being pushed out to a position 
neatly corresponding to the ambiguities in the relation between 
Tapanuli and East Sumatra. At their birth, these factions were 
nicely balanced but Gintings1 coup against Makmour upset the 
equilibrium. It raised the possibility, or threat, of a renewed 
hegemony over East Sumatra by a single leader and his faction. 
This went very much against the grain in East Sumatra, as it was 
then, and it is this fact, I think, which accounts for the swift 
reply to Gintings in the October 19th coup.
These observations describe a context, not particular 
actors with particular motives. We cannot be quite certain 
about who organized the coup because the published sources are 
silent on this question. Djuanda and Nasution said nothing
least up to late November.
126. Waspada, December 18-20, 1957. On November 8th, Djuanda
revealed in the DPR that Nasution had ordered the Sector FF 
troops and Captain Jusuf; to go to Central Java for further 
training (PIA, November 9 (A), 1957. See also Waspada, 
November 13, 1957, reporting their departure).
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about it. No one came forward, as men did the previous December, 
to say that he was involved; the press did not discuss the mat­
ter.1* 7 Nevertheless, it seems fairly clear that the initiative 
for the coup came from Sugiharto, or at least from others acting 
on his behalf with his knowledge--which amounts to almost the 
same thing. He was declared panglima by the actors in the coup, 
though, of course, that does not necessarily mean that he planned 
it. It is hard to see who else in TT-I at the time had suf­
ficient stature to lead a coup against Gintings.127 28 129 The five 
units involved in the actual coup were all from Medan, Sugihartofs 
territory, and, of these, two (cavalry and artillery) had been 
associated with him in the Sapta Marga Operation, another (CPM) 
was also commanded by a non-Sumatran, and two (Sector FF and 
Battalion 131) were assigned to KMKB Medan. Finally, the 
proclamation of Sugiharto as panglima by a group/of NC0Ts and 
enlisted men has the look of a put-up job, and the picture of 
Sugiharto at the airport, informing Djuanda of important devel­
opments, is most convincing when read as the discreet presenta­
tion of a fait accompli.
Assuming that it was Sugiharto who organized the coup, one 
must ask what his motives were and who was behind him. As far 
as he himself was concerned, plain ambition or reluctance to 
come under too strong a panglima was presumably an important 
motive. He controlled Medan militarily, as he demonstrated on 
October 19th, and Medan was the key to East Sumatra. With 
Gintings1 strength growing, perhaps now was the time to act.
More broadly, one can see the basis for a tacit alliance between 
Nasution and SugihartoTs faction--non-Sumatran commanders of 
key units in Medan--in opposition to a locally-based panglima 
threatening to grow too big. The aftermath of the coup, as we 
shall see, is fully consistent with this interpretation.
Gintings, of course, was not simply locally-based; he was 
specifically a Karo. A potential Gintings-Karo hegemony neces­
sarily affected the interests of the non-Karo in East Sumatra, 
most obviously the two largest groups of these, the Toba and 
the Javanese. It is worth noting that the PKI soon charged 
that army officers from GintingsT faction, including the three 
who were sent off to Djakarta on the day of the coup, had plotted 
with the PNI leader Slamet Gintings to proclaim a separate East 
Sumatra province on October 20th. 29 The specific charge may
127. The one exception that I know of is Waspada, October 23, 
1957, which says that Sugiharto tried to supplant Gintings.
128. One looks naturally to the commander of the Second Regiment. 
But Manaf Lubis, though he had been active in East Sumatra 
during the revolution, had been away from TT-I for some 
time, most recently in SSKAD. In any case he had been only 
a few weeks in office. There are no indications that he 
played much of a role in the military politics of late 1957.
129. Harian Rakjat, November 15, 1957 (Jusuf Adjitorop in the 
DPR) . This contention served to justify the October 19th
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not have been true--there is no other evidence for it--but there 
is no doubt that high feeling on both sides of this issue, and 
suku tension generally, were important in the background of the 
October 19th coup. Thus one finds the Toba commander of Bat­
talion 131, Henry Siregar, joining the otherwise quite alien 
Sugiharto faction in the action of the coup.130
The October 19th Affair had important consequences in TT-I, 
though they were more purely military and, even in that respect, 
less sweeping than the changes which followed Simbolonfs coup 
ten months earlier. It is clear, to begin with, that Gintings 
emerged from the Affair with severely diminished authority. He 
was forced to flee and was later restored, not by his own actions, 
but by Nasution’s intervention. He spent all but a few days of 
the next four weeks outside Medan, reported variously as on sick 
leave, vacationing and inspecting. He does not seem to have re­
sumed the actual functions of his office until late November or 
early December. The formal transfers of office in mid-December, 
which marked the end of the Affair, closed with a spokesman for 
Nasution refusing to comment on reports that Gintings would be 
transferred from TT-I and saying that anything could happen.131
One of the corollaries of GintingsT weakened position was 
that Nasution greatly strengthened his own hold on TT-I. He 
was able to re-impose Gintings in a situation in which military 
strength lay, for the time being at least, on the other side.
He re-installed Lt. Col. Hasan Kasim, an outsider and a personal 
representative of his, as Acting Chief of Staff. He was able 
to bring in the RPKAD troops, who were not connected with or 
controllable by any of the local officers.132 Finally, he
action as a pre-emptive coup. Slamet Gintings and the PNI- 
SU countered with charges that the PKI was behind all the 
recent disturbances in East Sumatra, the October 19th coup 
as well as the Siantar raid and the Sector FF incident.
130. This distinction is emphasized by the participant informant 
mentioned in note 118. Djuandafs list of the factors lying 
behind the Affair included the East Sumatra province issue 
and tension between Javanese and Karo in East Sumatra (See 
PIA, November 9 (A), 1957 and Harian Rakjat, November 9, 
1957). The latter, something one hears little about in 
other reports of events during 1957, suggests that one might 
look on SugihartoTs group as at least partly a suku-based 
faction representing the interests of local Javanese.
131. Waspada, December 21, 1957.
132. On October 22nd, the day before the RPKAD arrived, Nasution 
took the trouble to deny that their coming had anything to 
do with the recent events in Medan. But a truer picture of 
what this move signified was given the same day in a state­
ment by the IPRI (Ikatan Perwira RI--Indonesian Officers’
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completely dominated the negotiations by which the Affair was 
settled.
Another corollary of Gintings1 decline was that Sugiharto 
seems to have maintained his position unaffected. It is true 
that Nasution spoke bluntly against the idea of ousting com­
manders by force, a sentiment which in the circumstances might 
seem to be addressed to Sugiharto. But he made no direct mention 
of Sugiharto in this connection and seems not to have punished 
his violation of discipline in any way.133 More concretely, 
Nasution confirmed the ouster of three of Gintings1 most promin­
ent supporters. Finally, he either arranged or agreed to ac­
cept Gintings being kept away from the seat of power for a 
month, while Sugiharto remained at the center of things in Medan. 
It seems as clear a case of favoring one side as his support 
of Gintings against Makmour in late September.
The last corollary of GintingsT decline is the most ironic, 
and takes us part of the way back to the beginning of the cycle 
of coups which we have been surveying. This is the clear 
evidence that the Toba faction within the army in East Sumatra, 
in eclipse since the Sapta Marga Operation, was reviving. With 
the participation of Henry Siregar’s battalion in the October 
19th coup against Gintings and with the reappearance of Siregar’s 
former commander, Boyke Nainggolan, as third in command of TT-I, 
the basis for Nainggolanfs March 16, 1958, raid on Medan had 
already come into being. We stand at the beginning of another 
round of military politics, new and yet familiar from the events 
we have been studying .13 *
Association) of the Second Regiment declaring that they 
were opposed to the bringing in of outside troops (PIA, 
October 23 (M), 1957). Early in November the Army press 
officer in Djakarta made it yet clearer when he said that 
the RPKAD would be withdrawn as soon as the military prob­
lems in TT-I had been solved (PIA, November 2 (M), 1957).
133. But Sugiharto did find it necessary to make two rather meek 
statements on October 21st. One was a personal statement 
that the whole affair was in Nasutionfs hands to solve.
The other was a statement of the local branch of IPRI, signed 
by Sugiharto, denying any knowledge of the broadcasts on 
the 19th which had proclaimed him panglima.(PIA, October 
22 (M), 1957). Djuanda reports the second of these state­
ments but says that it was made in the early afternoon of 
October 19th. It looks as if Djuanda pushed it back to the 
19th in order to make it seem as if Sugiharto was acting 
promptly and spontaneously and thus was not involved in the 
coup. If he is correct, however, we might have to revise 
our notion of the degree of SugihartoTs involvement in the 
coup.
134. To be sure Nainggolanfs raid was only a brief foray and 
Gintings managed to push Sugiharto out of TT-I in the
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It begins to be clear that what we have been looking at is 
not a series of disputes culminating in a solution of some sort 
but rather the inevitable and endless oscillation of power in a 
region of more or less evenly-balanced ethnic, religious and 
economic interests, intrinsically hostile to each other and no 
longer held in check by a national government embodying a na­
tional consensus. From this point of view, the successes and 
failures among the coups and other actions we have been examin­
ing have been mere accidents of circumstances, ephemeral be­
cause they could not permanently decide the fundamental conflicts 
of interest in the area.
Military politics, like other kinds of politics, can be 
studied on their own, and this study can-be absorbing in its 
own right. It seems to me, however, that such study is always 
more successful when it is closely related to the social context 
within which military politics takes place. In the present state 
of scholarly knowlege of modern Indonesian politics this means 
that such study is more likely to be successful, the more local 
or restricted its focus--down, for example, to where one can 
begin to think of the OPD as a social movement and not a prob­
lem, or, better still, down to where one can actually see it 
working on its own level. In this respect, as with regard to 
the perspective implications of different vantage points, Medan 
is just a half-way house.
same month, so that he enjoyed something approaching 
hegemony over TT-I for a considerable period thereafter. 
But this was in the special conditions prevailing during 
the PRRI rebellion, with many outside troops and much 
Djakarta interest in the area.
